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INTO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
1949 PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS
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INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS
I. THE BASIC JURIDICAL ISSUES.
The Security Council ,
Considerin g the urgentneed to spare the civil population
and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the
Middle East of additional sufferings,
Considerin g that essential and inalienable human rights
should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,
Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the
parties involved in the conflict,
Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety,
welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas
where military operations have taken place and to
facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have
fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;
Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupulous
respect of the humanitarian principles governing the
treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of
civilian persons in time of war, contained in the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;
Reguests the Secretary-General to follow the effective
implementation of this resolution and to report to the
Security Council.
Security Council Resolution 237 (1967), June 14, 1967 1
This Resolution of the United Nations Security Council,
which was passed within a week of the cease-fire ending the
June, 1967, Six-Day War, is an expression of opinion of that

Organ that the 1949 Geneva Conventions are applicable to the
Middle East coercion situation. It specifically mentions two
of those Conventions, the Geneva Convention Relative to the
2Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (hereinafter
referred to as the 1949 POW Convention) and the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
3Time of War of August 12, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as
the 1949 Civilians Convention) and the "Governments concerned"
are called upon to respect their humanitarian principles.
Resolution 237 is, in addition, a codification of the
principle that supports the international laws of war, that
of balancing military necessity with humanitarian protections
4for war victims. This principle is the basis of the first
two paragraphs which speak of sparing the civilian population
and prisoners of war of additional sufferings, and respecting
essential and inalienable human rights in time of war. The
Resolution also reminds Israel, in the fourth paragraph, of
its special obligations regarding the administration of the
territories occupied during the Six-Day War and in facilitating
the return of civilians who fled from their homes and lands
during the hostilities.
This study is intended as a juridical inquiry into the
applicability of Resolution 237 and the 1949 POW and Civilians
Conventions to one aspect of the Middle East coercion situation,
that of the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinian
people. The bases of the study will be the provisions of

Resolution 237 and the issue to be resolved is the applicability
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to this confrontation.
It is suggested that at the time Resolution 237 was adopted
by the Security Council its language was appropriate to the
5Middle East coercion situation. The participants were states,
namely Israel and the Arab states, principally Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan and Egypt, and the implementation of the humanitarian
principles of the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions was
dependent on their acceptance by the Governments of those
states. Repeated endorsements of this Resolution and calls
upon the participants to implement the principles of the
Conventions by both the Security Council and the General
Assembly, are evidence that their humanitarian principles
have not been applied and necessitate an inquiry into the
applicability of the Conventions to the Middle East coercion
situation of 1970.
Since June, 1967, the situation in the Middle East has
gradually deteriorated and the establishment of a system of
minimum world public order in that area appears unlikely for
the forseeable future. However, out of this deterioration
two new aspects of the coercion situation have emerged which
are responsible for much of the recent increase in the
intensity of the hostilities and which in the future might
involve even additional nation-states as direct participants
in the fighting. One of these new aspects is the direct
participation of the Soviet Union in the defense of Egypt

through the installation and manning of anti-aircraft missiles
7
and the flying of air defense missions by Soviet pilots,
which will not be discussed in this study. The other new
aspect is the emergence of the Palestinian people as an
independent participant in the continuing hostilities against
Israel . It is the emergence of the Palestinian people as a
separate, independent participant in the Middle East coercion
situation which requires a re-examination of the applicability
of the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions to war victims of
the area and with which this study is concerned.
Although various other writers have concluded that Israel
has violated specific articles of the Conventions and the news
media has deplored the actions of the Palestinian guerrillas
in their attacks on civilian targets throughout the Middle East
and Europe, the basic juridical issue of whether the 1949
Geneva Conventions are applicable in a coercion situation of
international character in which one participant is a nation-
state and the other is a public organization independent of
any nation-state has not been thoroughly considered.
Some international writers might conclude that such an
inquiry is unnecessary because the Palestinians are not a
separate, independent participant in the Middle East coercion
situation, but rather are controlled and directed by the Arab
o
States. Israel, in fact, so claims. To accept such claims
would indeed negate the necessity for this inquiry, since all
of the principal Arab state participants are High Contracting

9Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Palestinian and
Israeli war victims would be then entitled to their humanitarian
protections in a derivative manner. However, an analysis of
the Middle East coercion situation reveals that the Palestinians
are not fighting on behalf of the Arab states but for themselves
Therefore, the factual basis for this legal conclusion is not
supported, and if the war victims resulting from the
confrontation between Israel and the Palestinian people are
entitled to the humanitarian protections of the laws of war
the Conventions must be applicable to a coercion situation in
which one of the participants is not a nation-state.
The method of analysis utilized in this study will be
first to identify the participants in the coercion situation
under inquiry, which will be referred to as the Israeli/
Palestinian people coercion situation. Basically, the
Palestinian people will be identified as a separate,
independent participant which is not fighting on behalf of
the Arab states. This inquiry will identify the origins of
the Palestinian people, their bases of power and their
objectives in supporting this status.
Secondly, the legal status of the so-called "Occupied
Territories" will be analyzed to determine Israel's rights
to exercise de jure sovereignty in those areas . This inquiry
is necessitated because of a Zionist claim that Israel has
greater rights of sovereignty than any other state in these
areas and is relevant to any determination of Israel's

obligation to apply the humanitarian protections of the 1949
Civilian Conventions to the inhabitants of those territories.
That obligation is based, first, on a determination of Israel's
status under international law within the territories, and,
second, on a determination of the specific applicability of
the 1949 Civilians Convention to the war victims depending on
their geographic location. In both of these first two sections
of inquiry, Zionism is extremely relevant and will be identified
and discussed.
Once these juridical and factual issues are resolved the
1949 POW and Civilians Conventions, themselves, will be
analyzed and discussed. This aspect of the inquiry is perhaps
the most critical in this study since neither Convention was
designed to apply to the type of coercion situation that has
emerged. Both were designed to apply in international coercion
situations between states and any juridical inquiry must
evaluate their applicability in terms of their general purpose
and giving effect to that purpose. In this inquiry the
character of the coercion situation as either international
or internal, and the legal status of the occupied territories
is relevant, since the Conventions do not apply, except for a
single Article, to internal coercion situations or civil wars.
When the applicability of the Conventions is considered a
two step juridical inquiry must be made and will be utilized
in this study. The first step is to determine if the
Conventions are applicable to the Israeli/Palestinian people

coercion situation under the provisions of Article 2 and the
failure of both participants, Israel and the Palestinian
people, to accept and apply the protections of the Conventions
is relevant to this determination. Then, the specific
individuals entitled to either the status of a prisoner of
war or a protected person must be determined under the
provisions of Article 4 of each Convention. Neither of these
inquiries can necessarily be completely separated from the
other, but both Articles must be satisfied before the
humanitarian protections of either Convention are available
to war victims.
Finally, the results of the inquiry will be appraised
and recommendations for future international action recommended,
with a view towards insuring that the humanitarian protections
of the 1949 POW Convention and Civilians Convention be
extended to all war victims in the Israeli/Palestinian people
coercion situation. This final appraisal of the study is
perhaps the most relevant in that to conclude certain
individuals are entitled to the humanitarian protections
of the Conventions without recommendations for the
implementation of those protections would be meaningless.
It is also intended that this study will have relevance
to future coercion situations that may emerge which will be
similar to the one under inquiry. This is the reason the
Israeli claim that the Palestinian people are not a separate,
independent participant in the total Middle East coercion

situation has not been accepted by this writer, and the
humanitarian protections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
extended to them in a derivative manner through the Arab
states. This would be a simple solution to a difficult
problem since all of the Arab states are parties to the
Conventions, but might only forestall the necessity for
such an inquiry to a later date.
It would then have to be made, for example, if the
population of South-West Africa, tiring of the policy of
apartheid, rose up in revolt against the authority of the
Union of South Africa in an attempt to gain independence.
Since the revolting population initially would be neither
a state or a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the
resulting coercion situation would have to be analyzed to
determine if the Conventions would be applicable. Rather
than wait for such an event in South-West Africa or elsewhere,
it is appropriate to make the juridical inquiry now in the
case of the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation.
In any inquiry of this nature, the writer is always open
to criticism that he is either pro-Arab or pro-Israeli. It
is impossible to make such an inquiry without discussing
certain claims and facts which lend support to such criticism.
However, it is not the purpose of this study to support or
condemn either belligerent in the coercion situation under
inquiry but rather to determine if the war victims resulting
from the hostilities are entitled to the protections of the

1949 POW and Civilians Conventions. Thus, this study should
be read as an effort at a juridical inquiry into the
humanitarian protections to which these individuals are
entitled as the first step towards the establishment of a
system of minimum world public order in the Middle East.
What is involved is a determination of whether the
humanitarian provisions of the international laws of war,
as contained in the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions, are
applicable to a coercion situation apparently not contemplated
by the drafters of those Conventions. This determination must
be based on an interpretation and application of those
Conventions, and the laws of war generally, in an effort to
give effect to their purposes. Thus, an interpretation must
be made which will give the maximum protection to all war
victims, including civilian persons and prisoners of war,
resulting from the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation
and future coercion situations of a similar character.
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IT. AN EXAMINATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AS A PARTICIPANT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST COERCION SITUATION: THE EMERGENCE OF
A NEW ENTITY IN THE CONFRONTATION.
May observers view the Middle East coercion situation as a
confrontation between Israel and the Arab states and fail to
recognize the existence of the Palestinian people as a separate,
independent participant in the continuing hostilities. This
section will consist of a factual analysis of the Palestinian
people, identifying the origin, bases of power, influence and
objectives of that entity to determine if it must be considered
as a separate participant in a juridical analysis of the laws
of war applicable to the present confrontation.
Basically, the thesis will be developed that the
Palestinian people are not fighting on behalf of any of the
Arab states but for themselves, are not under the effective
control of any of the Arab states and have different objectives
from the Arab states, and accordingly must be considered as a
separate participant in the confrontation with Israel. This
separate status, although the central factual issue in this
study, is also the most important factor in resolving the
Middle East coercion situation and developing a system of
minimum world public order in that area. The destiny of all
the states involved in the present confrontation may well be
controlled in the future by the power, influence and objectives
of the Palestinian people. It is for all of these reasons that
an examination of this entity is relevant to any study of the
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Middle East coercion situation.
A. THE CREATION OF THE ENTITY IDENTIFIED AS THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE (1896-1967).
The terra "Palestinian people" by itself is ambiguous and
to understand the composition of this entity and to identify
its members, a brief survey of the Middle East coercion
situation is necessary. If one is to be completely accurate
the Palestinian people would include both Jewish and non-
Jewish Palestinians but as the term will be used in this study
it will not include the Jewish people who reside in the area
known as Palestine. Only the non-Jewish Palestinians,
Christians and Muslems, will be considered as true members
of the entity identified as the Palestinian people.
Although there has been a Palestine since Biblical times,
modern Palestine did not emerge until after World War I. Its
territory was part of the Ottoman Empire which after the war
was divided among the Allies under a series of mandates.
Modern Palestine became a separate entity in 1920 when Great
Britain was named the mandatory power over its territory by
the Allied Supreme Council on April 25th and later formally
confirmed as the mandatory power by the Council of the League
12
of Nations on July 22, 1922.
At the time Great Britain was formally confirmed as the
mandatory power there were 752,048 people in Palestine out of
13 ...
which 83,790 were Jewish. Thus, the non-Jewish Palestinians
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were a distinct majority of the population and should have
played a dominant role in the development of Palestine into
14
an independent state as contemplated by the mandate system.
However, this was not to be the case as evidenced by certain
subsequent events
.
When Great Britain assumed the duties as the mandatory
power over Palestine one of the first official actions taken
15
was to allow Jewish immigrants to enter that territory and
become citizens of the state. This immigration was not
accidental but the first step in the fulfillment of a Zionist
plan to establish a Jewish state in Palestine which would
exclude the non-Jewish Palestinians from its territory. This
plan was first announced in 1896 by Dr. Theodor Herzl in his
book "Judenstaat " (The Jewish State). Dr. Herzl reasoned that
because Jews were a separate nationality group they would never
be assimilated into the societies of the states where they
presently resided and the only solution was a Jewish state.
He stated in his book:
The whole plan is in its essence perfectly simple,
as it must necessarily be if it is to come within
the comprehension of all. Let the sovereignty be
granted us over a portion of the globe large enough
to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation;
the rest we shall manage for ourselves.
Zionism has always been a political movement concerned only
with creating a non-secular Jewish state, as evidenced by its
founder Dr. Herzl. It was formally constituted as such in 1897
when the first Zionist Congress met and created the Zionist
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Organization, whose purpose was to establish a Jewish state in
I o
Palestine. However, the Basle Declaration, adopted at the
Congress, preferred to refer to a home instead of a state, and
provided m part, "(t)he aim of Zionism is to create for the
19Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law."
However, until World War I the efforts of the Zionists to
establish a national home in Palestine met with little success.
Dr. Herzl died in 1904, buL the Zionist movement continued
to grow, spreading throughout Europe and to the United States.
When Great Britain entered World War I, the Zionists in that
country were directed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, whose stated
political purpose was "...to obtain a guarantee from the Allies
that, in the event of Turkey's defeat, Palestine would be
recognized as a Jewish commonwealth, unrestricted to open
20immigration." Great Britain and the other Allies became
generally receptive to the Zionists, for it was "...believed
in Great Britain that an understanding with the Zionists would
produce a new ally in the form of world Jewry" which would
21
assist the Allies in the final victory over Germany and Turkey.
Dr. Weizmann's efforts on behalf of Zionism were only
partially successful in obtaining this guarantee when the
British government, in 1917, issued the Balfour Declaration.
It provided,
His Majesty's Government view with favour the
establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, and will use their best
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of

14
this object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country.
This somewhat ambiguous pledge from the British government
concerning the future of Palestine was thereafter to be
incorporated into the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine23
and become one of the claimed legal bases for the creation of
24
the Zionist state called Israel.
However, although the Zionists and Israel claim that Dr.
Herzl and the First Zionist Congress proclaimed the right of
the Jewish people to their own state and that " (t)his right
25 .
was recognized by the Balfour Declaration...." it appears that
the statement of the British government had no juridical value.
Since Great Britain at the time the British Government issued
the Balfour Declaration had no right of sovereignty over
Palestine, it is clear that it could not grant or transfer
such right to the Zionists or Jewish people. It is also
important to note that the Balfour Declaration speaks of a
"national home" and not a state, recalling that the Zionist
purpose was to create a Jewish state in Palestine and that
they later claimed that the Balfour Declaration recognized
their right to do so.
This claim and the plan of creating a Jewish state are,
however, inherent in the objectives and nature of Zionism.
If one considers Judaism basically a religion it becomes
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readily apparent that not all Jews are Zionists and not all
27Zionists are Jews. As expressed by Dr. Herzl and Dr.
Weizmann, Zionism is basically a national movement and is
considered incompa table with the religious bases of Jewry
9 R
by many prominent Jews.
This difference between politics and religion was
emphasized by Jacob H. Schiff, a co-head of the American
Jewish Committee during World War I, when he stated,
I believe that I am not far wrong if I say that
from fifty to seventy percent of the so-called
Jewish Nationalists are either atheists or
agnostics and that the great majority of the
Jewish Nationalist leaders have absolutely no
interest in the Jewish religion.
Another fault of Zionism was pointed out by Mr. Mayer Sulzberger
who opposed Zionism on the ground that it constituted a denial
of democracy. He defined democracy as the situation where the
people who live in a country select their own rulers who shall
preserve their powers. Then he argued that Zionism in Palestine
would deprive the people already there of their right of self-
government and impose on them the will of people from the
30
outside who may never even see Palestine.
A further denounciat ion of the Zionist program for
Palestine was made in 1919 and reveals even more of the nature
and effects of Zionism. This denounciat ion was included in the
recommendations of the King-Crane Commission, which was
appointed by President Wilson to determine which of the Western
nations should be appointed the mandatory power over Palestine.
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Its report to the World War I Peace Conference, dated August
28, 1919, provided in part; "We recommend, in the fifth place,
serious modification of the extreme Zionist program for
Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally
31
to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State." The report
went on to note that such modification was required to safeguard
the rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine, which was
32provided for in the Balfour Declaration. This was based on
the following findings of the Commission:
33 .
For "a national home for the Jewish people" is
not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish
State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State
be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon
the "civil and religious rights of the existing
non-Jewish communities in Palestine."-^ 4 The fact
came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference
with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists
looked forward to a practically complete disposition
of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine,
by various forms of purchase.
As an additional warning the Commission noted that even though
the Zionists proposed to purchase the land needed for their
state, "(n)o British officer, consulted by the Commissioners,
believes that the Zionist program could be carried out except
by force of arms."
Rabbi Elmer Berger, a leading anti-Zionist Jew, has more
recently described Zionism as follows:
What this Zionism is - and has been - is a movement,
well organized, to persuade the world community of
nations by the use of all available instruments of
national policy, that all the Jews of the world
voluntarily elect to possess a so-called "Jewish
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nationality". Prior to 1948 and the establishment
of the Zionist State of Israel, Zionism argued
that this "Jewish" nationality was homeless. Jews
were an unassimilable nationality group which had
been and always would be plagued by anti-Semitism.
The solution of this problem, according to Zionism,
was for the world to recognize, in fact and in law,
a nationality entity called "the Jewish people" and,
in fact and in law, to give to this "homeless"
nationality entity territorial rights in which .,_
this displaced nationality could be sovereign....
The importance of Zionism, as a national movement with the
purpose of creating a non-secular Jewish state in Palestine
and excluding all non-Jews from that state, to this study is
that it has resulted in the creation of the entity known as
the Palestinian people during the twenty-eight years Great
Britain administered Palestine as the mandatory power.
Even though the nature of the Zionist program was
recognized prior to 1920, Great Britain was named the mandatory
power over Palestine and allowed mass Jewish immigration into
its territory for most of the twenty-eight years the mandate
was in effect. Initially there was low-level violence between
the Jewish and non-Jewish people in Palestine and most of it
was ignored by the world community. Then after World War II,
the level of violence rapidly escalated as the prediction of
the King-Crane Commission became reality and the Zionists
within Palestine resorted to violence and force of arms to
create the State of Israel.
This internal strife reached such proportions that on
April 2, 1947, Great Britain, as the mandatory power, took the
problem to the United Nations. A committee was appointed and
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after an investigation issued a report on August 31, 1947.
The Committee recommended unanimously that the mandate be
terminated and Palestine be granted complete independence as
soon as possible. A majority of the Committee recommended
the establishment of two separate states in Palestine, an Arab
39
state and a Jewish state, with an economic union between
them, and an international trusteeship for the City of
40Jerusalem. A minority of the Committee recommended an
independent federal state composed of an Arab state and a
41Jewish state, with Jerusalem as its capital. This federal
state would have a single Palestinian nationality and
v.- 42citizenship
.
After debate, the General Assembly of the United Nations
on November 29, 1947, adopted a Resolution on the Future
Government of Palestine by a vote of 33 to 13, with 10
43
abstentions, which basically approved the majority proposal
of the Special Committee, and set up independent Arab and
44Jewish states and an international status for Jerusalem.
After the passage of the so-called Partition Plan, and
its acceptance by the Zionists and its rejection by the non-
45 ...Jewish people of Palestine, the level of violence within
Palestine increased to such an extent that on January 1, 1948,
the British announced that they would terminate the mandate
46
and withdraw all of their forces by May 15, 1948. In
anticipation of the British withdrawal, the Zionists proclaimed




recognized by the United States and two days later by the
49Soviet Union
.
However, in anticipation of the creation of Israel, the
Zionists engaged in a systematic terror campaign to drive the
non-Jewish Palestinians from its territory as proposed in the
United Nations Partition Plan. Thus, by the time that Israel
was proclaimed on May 14, 1948, there were already 350,000
50Arab refugees that had left its territory. This fact alone
is sufficient to disprove the Zionist claim that the refugees
are a result of the 1948 Arab attack on Israel and that they
were ordered to flee from their homes by Arab leaders to return
51
after Israel had been destroyed.
The facts, now available, instead support the conclusion
that it was Zionist terror that created the Arab refugees that
numbered 800,000 by 1949. Mr. John Davis, former Commissioner-
52 ...General of UNRWA has described Zionism as a movement involved
in "...the uniting of Jews of the world into a single
consciousness based on nationality: a consciousness that has
53
the attributes of a supra-national Jewish state." Then he
points out that Zionism could never have achieved this goal
...unless Palestine were a country in which the
Jewish population constituted a strong majority.
However, in November 1947, when the partition
vote took place at the United Nations the area
designated for the Jewish people was equally
populated by Arabs and Jews . ^ During the
fighting of 1948-49, Israel increased her land
area by some thirty percent. In this enlarged
area of 1949, the Arabs constituted about sixty-
four percent and the Jews only thirty-six percent
of the total population. At the time she declared
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her statehood, Israel was confronted with a grave
problem in that the Jews actually constituted a
decided minority in the territory she held.
Israel resolved this dilemma by forcing Arab
people out of,- the territory and then blocking
their return.
A significant step in this campaign was the massacre at
the village of Deir Yasin in April, 1948. "Over 250 old men,
women and children were deliberately butchered, stripped and
mutilated or thrown into a well by men of the Zionist Irgun
56
Zvai Leumi . " After the massacre "Irgun then called a press
conference to announce the deed; paraded other captured Arabs
through Jewish quarters of Jerusalem to be spat upon; then
57
released them to tell their km of the experience." At the
same time loudspeakers began to broadcast the message to the
Arabs, "(u)nless you leave your homes the fate of Deir Yasin
CO
will be your fate."
Although the official Zionist organizations operating in
Palestine at the time denied responsibility for the massacre
at Deir Yasin, the facts appear to indicate it was just another
step in the Zionist campaign to force the non-Jewish Palestinians
from the territory of the proposed Zionist state. In fact, it
was an important step in creating the Zionist concept of a
non-secular Jewish state in Palestine and excluding from its
territory all the non-Jewish Palestinians.
The object of this appalling massacre at Deir Yasin
was to terrorize the Arabs of the country into
fleeing from their homes, and the policy was crowned
with almost complete success when nearly three
quarters of a million Arabs fled from Palestine.
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That this was the aim of the massacre was
established by official statements of the
organizations which were responsible for it,
and it has been established again recently by
reliable historians of the Israel Defence Army,
who say that this incident resulted in the
"terrified flight" of the Arabs.
These facts support the conclusion that even before Israel was
created the Zionists had pursued a deliberate policy of excluding
non-Jewish Palestinians from the territory of their proposed
state in order to fulfill the Zionist Plan for a non-secular
state
.
After the National Council in Tel-Aviv declared Israel a
state the immediate reaction of the Arab countries was an
invasion of Palestine. Arab armies from Syria, Lebanon,
Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt entered Palestine and started
fighting an Israeli army, made up primarily of the old self-
defense organization, Hagannah . This phase of the military
action ended in 1949 when cease-fire and armistice agreements
were arranged with the various Arab states, Egypt on February
24, 1949, 61 Lebanon on March 22, 1949, Jordan on April 3, 1949,
and Syria on July 20, 1949.
However, by the time the last armistice agreement was
signed approximately 1,000,000 non-Jewish Palestinians had been
driven from the territory under Zionist control. At the
same time the Zionists had enlarged the territory under their
control from 56.47 percent of Palestine, as granted in the
United Nations Partition Plan, to 77.40 per cent, or over three-
64fourths, of the territory, and after the armistice allowed
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The remainder of Palestine was occupied by the armed forces
of Trans Jordan, the West Bank, and Egypt, the Gaza Strip, and it
was to these areas that most of the non-Jewish Palestinians fled
The significance of this flight can be seen in the following
observation
:
What this meant in terms of motive can be seen in
the statistics that followed the Arab exodus. More
than 80 per cent of the entire land area of Israel
is land abandoned by the Arab refugees . Nearly a
quarter of all the standing buildings in Israel had
been occupied by those Arabs. Ten thousand shops,
stores and other firms inside new Israel had been
Arab. Half of all the citrus fruit holdings in the
new State had belonged to the Arabs now made
refugees
.
These refugees and the pre-1949 inhabitants of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip are the people which will be referred
to as the Palestinian people in this thesis. They are simply
the non-Jewish Palestinians, who for the most part were
excluded from the Zionist state of Israel in the 1948 to 1949
period. The great majority of the Palestinian people after
1949 lived outside of the area controlled by Zionist Israel
C
-J
but within the territory of mandatory Palestine. Since after
1948 Egypt occupied and governed the Gaza Strip and Jordan the
West Bank, the Palestinian people did not govern any of their
territory, had no effective government and none of the
C o
attributes of statehood . They were politically inert and
69
without effective leadership, and until after the Six-Day
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War in June, 1967, could not be considered a participant in the
Middle East coercion situation. They were a stateless people,
many of them driven from their homes by Zionism, who were under
the effective control of foreign states. However, the events
since June 5, 1967, have dramatically changed the nature of
this entity and the Palestinian people have emerged as a
separate, independent participant in the Middle East coercion
situation
.
B . THE EMERGENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AS A SEPARATE
PARTICIPANT IN THE MIDDLE EAST COERCION SITUATION.
Early in the morning of June 5, 1967, Israeli armed forces
invaded Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and after less than a week of
fighting occupied some 43,750 square miles of additional
70 . .territory. Included within these occupied areas were the
West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the old city of Jerusalem, which
. . 71
contained over one million Palestinian people. The Arab
states' armies had been destroyed as an effective fighting
force and the pledges of the Arab states' leaders to liberate
Palestine from the Zionists appeared as empty promises. Out
of this defeat, however, the Palestinian people have emerged
as an effective, independent participant in the continuing
Middle East coercion situation. The significance of the June
War had been described by one writer as follows:
The most important consequence thus far of the
1967 Arab-Israeli war has been the emergence
of the Palestinian resistance movement as a
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major factor in the Middle East. Neither Israel,
the Arab states, nor the great powers can any-
longer ignore its existence and significance, for
it has shown that it can affect the interests, if
not the destinies, of them all .... (T)he Palestinian
partisian organizations have themselves attained a
degree of political legitimacy .... Today the
Palestinians, for better or worse, have a renewed
sense of political identity and are developing
effective organizations for political and military
action
.
The end result has been that "(t)he confrontation is no longer
an Arab-Israeli confrontation; it is a confrontation between
73
Israel and the Palestine resistance movement."
This shift in the nature of the confrontation after June,
1967, was not instaneous but began in 1955 when Egypt organized
the first guerrilla forces from the Palestinians living in Gaza
74
and dispatched them into Israel on subversive missions. Prior
to June, 1967, various guerrilla organizations were founded which
conducted operations against Israel but they were dependent on
the Arab states and were not an independent participant in the
75
confrontation with Israel. However, since that time these
Palestinian guerrilla organizations have emerged from the
dominance and control of the Arab states, and have become an
independent participant in the confrontation.
This independence is centered around the Palestine
Liberation Organization which was established in 1964 by the
Arab League with its own army, the Palestine Liberation Army,
which was "...to serve as a vanguard for the liberation of
the usurped part of Palestine." The army was actually formed




The Palestine Liberation Organization was constituted
"...as the official voice of the Palestinian community ...
and was given quasi-diplomatic status and financial support"
7ftby the Arab states, principally Egypt. The Constitution of
the Palestine Liberation Organization indicated that it was to
be the representative of all the Palestinian people by providing
"All the Palestinians are natural members in the Liberation
Organization exercising their duty in the liberation of their
. . . . . 79homeland in accordance with their abilities and efficiency."
The Constitution also established The National Assembly of the
fin
Palestine Liberation Organization which was to meet every two
ft i
years, rotating between Jerusalem and Gaza, established an
ft?
Executive Committee of fifteen members and provided that the
President of the Executive Committee would represent the
o qOrganization at the Arab League.
Until the Six-Day War in June, 1967, the Palestine
Liberation Organization and the various Palestinian guerrilla
organizations remained under the control of the Arab states
but the defeat of the Arab states' armies and the Palestine
Liberation Army in the conflict produced the change previously
mentioned. This change took place for two reasons. First,
the majority of the Palestinians had relied on the promises
of the various leaders of the Arab states to liberate Palestine
and the defeat suffered by the Arab armies demonstrated how
empty these promises had been. It became apparent that the
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R4Palestinians themselves would have to liberate their homeland.
Second, was the reason that within the territories occupied
by Israel at the conclusion of the Six-Day War were over one
p c
million Palestinians who resided in Gaza and the West Bank
and "...who were bitterly resentful of their defeat and
implacably hostile to the occupiers." Many of these people
were Palestinians who had been driven from the territory of
Palestine that had become Israel during and after the 1948-1949
war, and who now came under Israeli control as the occupying
power. It was primarily these people who felt that the Arab
states could do nothing for them in the struggle to liberate
Palestine from the Zionists and since Israeli forces occupied
all of their land, they became resistance fighters and began
their own independent struggle to liberate Palestine.
A new generation of leaders of the Palestinian people has
also emerged which are disciplined and purposeful. One of the
first changes these new leaders made was in the leadership of
the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had been generally
discredited during the June War when its inadequately armed and
trained army was easily overrun by Israeli forces in the Gaza
Strip. The Organization was reconstituted under the leadership
of Yahya Hammudah and held a third National Assembly in July,
1968, at Cairo (because both Jerusalem and Gaza were occupied
by Israel) to which many of the previously excluded guerrila
87
groups sent delegates. This was one of the first steps in the
development of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole
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representative of the Palestinian people and as a genuine
guerrilla organization with the purpose of liberating Palestine
Additional National Assemblies have been held since July,
1968, at which the Palestine Liberation Organization has been
further reorganized. At an Assembly held in February, 1969,
Fatah, the oldest guerrilla organization, won control of the
Organization and its leader, Yassir Arafat, was elected
o o
President of the Executive Committee. At this same meeting
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which claims
credit for various attacks on Israeli planes and property
outside of the Middle East and on non-military targets within
89
Israel and the occupied territories, was excluded from the
Organization
.
Despite the exclusion of the Popular Front there has been
a trend towards consolidation of the Palestinian guerrilla
groups under the sponsorship of Fatah and the Palestine
Liberation Organization. In April, 1969, the formation of a
Palestinian Armed Struggle Command took place with the purpose
of improving military co-operation among the various guerrilla
90 ...forces. Also as a result of the consolidation the various
Arab governments have come out in support of the guerrillas'
activities and have given them financing, as contrasted with
91
the policy of restraint that existed prior to June, 1967.
The activities of the Palestinian people have not been
limited, however, to military organization but extend to other
government-like functions. Palestinian schools have been

opened, a nurse corps and youth organizations have been
92formed, and
. . . the Palestinians are developing an administrative
infra-structure for procurement, finance, education
and "welfare . . . ; the Palestinian Arabs hope that these
quasi-governmental structures will someday comprise
the nucleus of a Palestine Arab State. The Movement
is generously financed, largely from Palestinians and
other Arabs in the oil producing states. Arab
governments finance the Palestine Liberation
Organization and provide facilities in varying
degrees for all the guerrilla groups. y3
The result of these activities is that the Palestinians assert
that they are now an independent movement organized on a
resistance basis, because of the Zionist occupation of
Palestine, which must be considered as a separate participant
from the Arab states in the Middle East coercion situation.
An examination of the relations of the Palestinian people
with the various Arab states confirms this independent status.
The various restrictions Lebanon and Jordan have attempted to
place on the activities of the Palestinian guerrillas operating
from their territory have been withdrawn or modified after the
94guerrillas refused to obey them. This has caused one writer
to observe :
In the Arab setting, at least since June, 1967,
it is not even clear that the Arab governments
have much leverage over the activities of the
principal liberation groups within their territory.
These groups concurrently enjoy such strong popular
backing that some Arab governments (most obviously
Jordan) would risk their stability and jeopardize
their popular backing if deliberate and overt
measures to control a liberation movement were
undertaken as official policy.
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Recent events in both Jordan and Lebanon give support to this
observation and clearly demonstrate the control the
Palestinians have over the governments of those states.
However, Jordan and Lebanon are not the only Arab states
that have recognized the independence of the Palestinian
people. At a meeting of the Arab Defense Council in Cairo
on November 8, 1969, the status of the Palestine Liberation
Organization was recognized as being one of equality with the
thirteen Arab states attending the meeting. The organization
had representatives at the meeting who spoke to the foreign
ministers, defense ministers and defense commanders who were
present, and who apparently participated on an equal basis
96
with the representatives of the Arab states. Since the
meeting was called for the purpose of co-ordinating military
.... 97
action against Israel by a joint military command, the
inclusion of the Palestine Liberation Organization for such
purpose is further recognition of the independent status the
Palestinian people have gained since the Six-Day War. This
recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization was also
included in the final resolutions of the meeting which gave
full support to the Organization and which called for an Arab
Summit Conference at Rebat, Morocco, on December 29, 1969, to
98
which the Organization was invited.
These facts demonstrate that since the Six-Day War in
June, 1967, the Palestinian people have organized themselves
into various guerrilla organizations under the umbrella of the
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Palestine Liberation Organization and have become an independent
participant in the Middle East coercion situation. Their
strength and influence over the destiny of the confrontation
with Israel is recognized by the other Arabs when "(m)ajor
Arab leaders, including President Nasser of Egypt, ... (say)
they will enter into no peace settlements not subscribed to by
. . 99 . . .the Palestinians." This position of the Arab leaders is
simply an acknowledgement of the fact that the Palestinians
have become powerful enough militarily to continue their
guerrilla activities against Israel in the event a peace
settlement negotiated by the Arab states did not meet their
approval. However, although a major factor, the military power
of the Palestinian people is not the sole factor in recognizing
them as a separate participant in the confrontation with Israel.
C. A COMPARISON OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE AND THE ARAB STATES.
A real distinction exists today between the objectives,
in the confrontation with Israel, of the Palestinian people
expressed by the Palestine Liberation Organization and its
member organizations, and the Arab states. It is for this
reason, when coupled with their effective military and political
power, that the Palestinian people must be considered a separate
participant in the Middle East coercion situation and cannot




Although the Arab states at one time threatened and vowed
to destroy Israel as a state, apparently the lessons learned
from three wars have forced them to alter their original
objectives. A determination to destroy Israel is still spcXen
about by some Arab leaders but the present objectives of the
Arab states are the return of all the territory occupied by
Israel during the Six-Day War and a solution to the Palestinian
refugee problem, by either allowing the refugees to return to
their former homes or be paid compensation for their
100properties
.
President Nasser has clearly endorsed such objectives as
the policy of his government by indicating that he accepts the
United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 22,
1967, as the basis for a settlement of the coercion
situation and has denied he ever stated he intended to "throw
Israel into the sea." He has pointed out, however, that the
deprivation of the Palestinians of their land and homes is the
real problem in the Middle East which must be solved before
102 ...peace can come, thus highlighting the status and importance
of the Palestinian people.
The United Nations Resolution referred to by President
Nasser as the basis of a settlement of the Middle East coercion
situation provides in part:
The Security Council,
• • •
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles
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requires the establishment of a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East which should include
the application of both of the following
principles
:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of
belligerency and respect for and acknowledge-
ment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence of every State in
the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free
from threats or acts of force;
Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability
and political independence of every State in
the area, through measures including the
n
_
establishment of demilitarized zones; ....
By accepting this Resolution as the basis for peace, President
104
Nasser and the other Arab leaders have by implication
indicated that they are willing to recognize the existence of
Israel as a state rather than continue to claim the existence
of a Palestinian state. They also have indicated their
willingness to end the state of belligerency that has existed
between the Arab states and Israel since 1948. These concessions
would of course be in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from all
the occupied territories and a "solution" to the refugee
problem but effectively would recognize that Palestine no
longer exists and would not be constituted as a state in the
territory now claimed by Israel.
These objectives are in direct conflict with those of the
Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization
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which center around the creation of a Palestinian state, where
105 . .both Arabs and Jews can live together, and the elimination
of the Zionist state of Israel. To fully understand the
objectives of the Palestinian people, one must consider how
they view the present confrontation with Israel.
As the Palestinians see it, the issue can be simplified
as follows : twenty years ago there was a country
called Palestine in which Jews and Arabs - all
Palestinians - lived together. The proportion of
the population was one-third Jewish and two-thirds
Arab. What happened in 1948-49 was the well-armed,
well-organized Jewish minority physically and
literally chased out the Arab majority beyond
the borders of that country. The majority became
refugees and the minority became the State of
Israel. The majority wants nothing more than
to return to its country, to its home, to its
lands and practice the right of self-determination.
nfi
This is the simple and total case of the Palestinians.
This position of the Palestinian people has been
incorporated into the basic objective of Fatah which has
always been "...the liberation of all of Palestine from Zionist
. . 107 . . . .political control." In explaining their objective the
Palestinians have stated it is "...limited to the destruction
of the political structure of the state (Israel) and not the
people ... (since the) fight is against Zionism as a political
TOR
movement and not against the Jewish people." The end result
to be achieved is "(a) democratic Palestine where Arabs and
Jews enjoy equal rights and opportunities . . . " which would
109
replace the Zionist state of Israel. In the new Palestine
Jews would have religious freedom but "...would have to accept
the return of all the exiled Palestinian Arabs, to undergo




In analyzing these objectives of the Palestinian people
it is necessary to understand that their implementation would
require the destruction of the basic institutions of the State
of Israel and of the state itself, since the entire basis of
that state is Zionism. This result would be directly contra
to President Nasser's acceptance of the United Nations
Resolution which would require recognition of Israel and its
right to a continued existence as part of the peace formula.
Thus by comparing the objectives of the Arab states and
the Palestinian people, a basic conflict is revealed that at
times strains the relationship between the so-called "allies".
The Arab states, principally Egypt and Jordan, are clearly
interested in a diplomatic settlement of the coercion
situation, involving basically a return of the territory
lost in the Six-Day War, while at the same time insisting
112 . .
on a solution to the refugee problem. The Palestinian
people, on the other hand, seek the elimination of the Zionist
state of Israel and in its place the establishment of a
Palestinian state to which all Palestinians can return.
D. CONCLUDING APPRAISAL OF THE STATUS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.
The entity hereinafter referred to as the "Palestinian
people" is, therefore, a creation of Zionism. When the Zionist
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program of creating an independent Jewish state and excluding
non-Jews from its territory was implemented, the initial
result was approximately 800,000 unorganized refugees. They
fled to the neighboring Arab states and the remaining territory
of Palestine occupied by Jordan and Egypt, and lived there with
other Palestinians under the control of other states. The
Palestinian people had been created as an entity but it was
not until the June, 1967, Six-Day War, when Israeli armed
forces occupied the remainder of Palestine, that the nature
of the Arab-Israeli confrontation changed and the Palestinian
people emerged from years of foreign domination.
Since this change in the nature of the Middle East
coercion situation, if one considers the independent power
and influence of the Palestinian people and their differing
objectives from the Arab states, the only reasonable conclusion
that can be drawn is that they are an independent participant
in the confrontation with Israel. The basic differences
between the objectives of the Palestinian people and the Arab
States in this confrontation alone are sufficient to require
recognition of this independent status, but when considered
along with their relative military and political power such
independent status is without issue. These factors have led
to the following observation: "Today, the conflict has
reassumed its true colors. The conflict is between Israel-
Zionism-and the Palestinians - people whom Israel and Zionism
113have driven out of their homes."
Accordingly, when the applicability of the 1949 Prisoners
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of War and Civilians Conventions to this conflict are considered
the Palestinian people must be considered as separate
participants who are not fighting on behalf of any of the Arab
states but for themselves to achieve their own objectives.
Therefore, if they are entitled to the protections of these
Conventions, it must be in their own right and not because
of protection derived through the various Arab states who are




III. THE LEGAL STATUS UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE WEST BANK, THE GAZA STRIP AND THE OLD CITY OF
JERUSALEM
.
This section will be a juridical analysis of the right
of Israel to exercise de jure sovereignty over the territory
of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the old city of
Jerusalem, which were occupied in 1967. At the same time,
the international boundaries, or the territory over which
Israel is the de jure sovereign, will also be considered.
In making this determination, the legal status of these
areas under public international law must be analyzed, as
well as the effect various occupations by Arab and Israeli
armed forces have had on that status. Therefore, the analysis
of this section will consider the United Nations Partition
Resolution, the Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian occupations
of 1948-1949, the Israeli occupation of 1967, and the actions
taken during the various occupations by the occupying powers.
Israel's right of de jure sovereignty has been asserted
by the Zionists and is relevant to a determination of the laws
of war that are applicable within the territories in guestion.
This right of de jure sovereignty must be contrasted with the
right of ae facto sovereignty which normally follows an
occupation or conquest by military forces and under which the
occupying or conquering state does not normally acquire the




sovereign of the occupied territory.
Although Israeli forces also occupy the Golan Heights and
Siani, this section will not consider the legal status of those
areas since it is clear to this writer that Syria and Egypt,
respectfully, are the de jure sovereigns in these areas.
Israel is at most a belligerent occupant in these areas and
accordingly, the inquiry of this section will be directed at
the legal status of the other areas under Israeli occupation
since June, 1967.
A. THE CONTINUING EFFECT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
PARTITION RESOLUTION ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
"OCCUPIED TERRITORIES".
The United Nations Partition Resolution of November 29,
1947 provided in part:
3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the
Special International Regime for the City of
Jerusalem ..., shall come into existence in
Palestine two months after the evacuation of
the armed forces of the mandatory Power has
been completed but in any case not later than
1 October 1948. 1]"
At the time this resolution was passed the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip and the old city of Jerusalem were all part of Palestine
under the mandate and thus their future status was to be
determined by the provisions of the Partition Plan. Since the
population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was predominately
Arab or non-Jewish, these territories were included within
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117the boundaries of the proposed Arab state under the Plan.
Jerusalem, because it contains the holy places of three of the
world's religions, Christianity, Judaism and Muslimism, was
treated separately and a special international trusteeship was
proposed for its territory.
Thus, on or before October 1, 1948, the Partition
Resolution contemplated the establishment of an Arab state
within part of the territory of Palestine and the creation
of an international status for all of Jerusalem. However,
these provisions of the Partition Plan never became a reality
because of the hostilities that took place in Palestine
following the creation of Israel by the Zionists on May 14,
1948.
When Israel was proclaimed by the Zionists they relied
on the United Nations Partition Plan as one of the legal bases
for their state. The State of Israel Proclamation of
Independence provides in part:
On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General
Assembly passed a resolution calling for the
establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel
;
the General Assembly required the inhabitants of
Eretz - Israel to take such steps as were necessary
on their part for the implementation of that
resolution. This recognition by the United Nations
of the right of the Jewish people to establish their
State is irrevocable.
At the same time the Zionists relied on the Balfour Declaration
and the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine as additional
120legal bases for the establishment of Israel, but the
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Partition Resolution was the only real action by the
International Community that specifically provided for the
121
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Since 1949, when the hostilities ended for the first time,
the Zionists have continued to rely on the Partition Resolution
as one of the legal bases for Israel but have denied that the
Palestinian people have any legal basis for their own state.
It follows that if the right of the Zionists to establish
Israel is "irrevocable" so is the right of the Palestinian
people to establish an Arab state. The Zionists, however, can
not admit that the Palestinian people have this right for such
an admission would contradict their claims regarding the
boundaries of Israel.
When the hostilities ended in 1949 the Zionists had
increased the territory under their control from 56.47 per cent
of Palestine, as included within the proposed Jewish state by
. . . 12?the Partition Resolution, to 77.40 per cent. Since 1949
Israel has claimed that all of this territory is within the
international boundaries of Israel even through the Partition
Resolution provided otherwise. Then, after the 1967 Six-Day
War, some Zionists have even claimed that over the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip and the old city of Jerusalem, Israel has the
123greatest right of sovereignty.
These claims are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Partition Resolution which included the excessive territories
occupied by the Zionists in 1948-1949, and the West Bank and
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the Gaza Strip within the proposed Arab State. Jerusalem,
both the old and new cities, was to have a special international
125
status. Therefore, when the Zionists continue to rely on the
Partition Resolution as one of the legal bases of Israel they
also admit to certain territorial limits of that state. The
Partition Plan's territorial limits for the Jewish state
specifically excluded the territory occupied by the Zionists
in 1967 and Israel itself has pointed out that the rights
guaranteed under that Plan are "irrevocable".
B. THE ZIONIST OCCUPATION IN 1948-1949 OF TERRITORIES
IN EXCESS OF THOSE INCLUDED WITHIN THE JEWISH STATE
UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION RESOLUTION.
If Israel 's right of de jure sovereignty is recognized
over the territory of Palestine included within the Jewish
state by the United Nations Partition Resolution, the issue still
remains as to whether it acquired de jure sovereignty over the
territory occupied in excess of the Resolution in 1948-1949.
Israel presently claims that the armistice lines provided in
the 1949 Armistice Agreements constitute its international
boundaries although those agreements provided otherwise.
Since the sovereignty over these territories was to be in an
Arab state under the Partition Plan, Israel's only claim to
de jure sovereignty must be based on general principles of
international law.
Traditional international law provided for various methods
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in which de jure sovereignty may be acquired over territory,
including occupation and conquest followed by subjugation.
Occupation is the act of appropriation by a State
through which it intentionally acquires sovereignty
over such territory as is at the time not under the
sovereignty of another State. Occupation as a mode
of acquisition differs from subjugation chiefly in
that the subjugated territory previously belonged
to another State.
The essential factor in acquiring sovereignty through occupation
is that the land must belong to no state to be subject to
-I o o
occupation, although territory that at one time belonged to
a state but which has been abandoned, can be subject to
129
occupation. "(0 )ccupation is effected through taking
possession of, and establishing an administration over, the
. . 130territory m the name of, and for, the acquiring State."
Occupation, under traditional international law, does not
normally occur during a coercion situation but there are no
131international law rules preventing such. Thus in the case
of the territory in question the basic issue is whether it
belonged to no state and was therefore subject to occupation
when it came under Israeli control in 1948 and 1949. In this
regard the reasons behind the failure of the Arab state,
proposed under the Partition Resolution, to come into existence
must be considered.
There are basically two reasons why the Arab state never
became a reality: first, the Arab leaders in Palestine
refused to agree to partition and the implementation of the
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Partition Plan; and second, the Zionists, through their terror
campaign, drove most of the Palestinian people from the
territory under consideration, as well as from the territory
132
of the proposed Jewish state. The issue to be resolved is
whether these factors rendered the territory of Palestine
subject to occupation.
Prior to May 15, 1948, Palestine was clearly not an
independent state but still had many of the attributes of a
133
state. There is, however, no agreement among international
lawyers as to the status of territory under a mandate in regards
134
sovereignty. The only real conclusion that can be drawn is
that some entity exercised sovereignty over Palestine during
the mandate and that its territory was not subject to occupation
135by any state with such intentions.
There appears to be no reason that this situation should
have changed in regard to Palestine after May 14, 1948, when
the British withdrew as the mandatory power and the State of
Israel was proclaimed. The fact that the Arab leaders refused
to accept partition or put into effect the Partition Plan is
not considered controlling over the issue of sovereignty of the
territory of Palestine. The only practical effect of their lack
of action is that an Arab state did not emerge that could ?ssume
de jure sovereignty over its proposed territory from whatever
entity had de jure sovereignty up to May 14, 1948.
Since it must be concluded that some entity exercised
sovereignty over the territory in question after May 14, 1948,
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the second issue to be resolved is whether that entity
abandoned the territory so that it became subject to occupation
by Israel . This issue can be answered if the Zionist terror
campaign is considered since the territory was not abandoned
by its occupants, the Palestinian people, but they were forced
to leave by the Zionists. Clearly the territory was not
abandoned but rather conquered by military force. Accordingly,
the conclusion must be reached that Israel did not acquire the
rights of de jure sovereignty over the territory that came under
its control in 1948 and 1949 in excess of that allotted to the
Jewish state under the Partition Resolution on the basis of
occupation, because this territory was not subject to
occupation
.
This conclusion still leaves unanswered the question of
whether Israel acquired de jure sovereignty over the territory
through conquest and subsequent subjugation.
Conquest is the taking possession of enemy territory
through military force in time of war. Conquest
alone does not ipso facto make the conquering State
the sovereign of the conquered territory, ....
Conquest is only a mode of acquisition if the
conqueror, after having firmly established the
conquest, formally annexes the territory. Such
annexation makes the enemy State cease to exist,
and thereby brings the war to an end. And as such
ending of war is named subjugation, it is conquest
followed by subjugation, and not conquest alone,
which gives a title, and is a mode of acquiring
territory . 137
Conquest, under traditional international law, therefore
consisted of "...the definitive and unambiguous appropriation
of all or part of the territory of the defeated belligerent
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which frequently had previously been under belligerent or
military occupation." Since Israel was engaged in a war,
or international coercion situation, immediately after the
state was established, and conquered the territory in question
during that war, it must be decided if it became the de jure
sovereign through conquest and subjugation.
There are some international writers who conclude that
conquest and subjugation are still a proper method of acquiring
139territory provided the war is legal under international law.
Other international writers have argued that de jure
U A ' ^ • 140sovereignty can no longer be acquired in this manner.
However, there is general agreement that title, or de jure
sovereignty, can not be acquired in this manner until there
is a treaty of peace or a complete cessation of hostilities.
Until such time the annexation or subjugation of conquered
. . 142territories by a belligerent occupant is prohibited.
Thus, in the case of Israel, de jure sovereignty has not
been acquired over the territory in question because there has
never been a treaty of peace or a complete cessation of
hostilities. The 1948-1949 hostilities were temporarily
suspended by Armistice Agreements which provided that
143territorial issues were not to be resolved by their terms
and there is general agreement among international writers
that an armistice agreement does not end the state of war but
. . . 144
merely temporarily suspends the hostilities. Accordingly,
any territory occupied by the belligerents is not subject to
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subjugation under the accepted principles of international law
upon the conclusion of an armistice and de jure sovereignty
remains where it was before the hostilities began.
Before concluding absolutely that Israel has never
acquired de jure sovereignty over the territory it occupied,
in excess of that included within the Jewish state, during
the 1948-1949 hostilities, brief mention should be made of
the effect of the exercise of de facto sovereignty for extended
periods of time. The issue to be resolved is whether Israel's
exercise of de facto sovereignty since 1949 has ripened into
de jure sovereignty because
(t)he actual exercise of territorial jurisdiction
tends to create a presumption in favor of the right
to exercise such jurisdiction. If such a de_ facto
exercise of jurisdiction is continuous and, in
relation to other states, peaceful, that is to say,
not contested, such a position is "as good as a
title". 145
When this issue is considered any conclusions that are
reached must be based on the attitude of the international
community concerning Israel's boundaries. Since the Arab
146 .
states have never recognized Israel as a state, it is clear
that they have not recognized Israeli sovereignty over any of
the territory presently under Zionist control. Thus, the
attitude of the other states comprising the world community
is relevant
.
There has never been a formal international agreement on
the international boundaries of Israel, although Israel has
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147been a member of the United Nations since May 11, 1949,
and has, therefore, been recognized as a state since at least
148that date. However, it can be said that the international
community has informally recognized Israeli sovereignty over
those territories occupied by the Israelis from 1949 to 1967
on the basis of recent United Nations Resolutions regarding the
withdrawal from those territories occupied in 1967. All of
these resolutions have called for Israel to withdraw to its
149pre-1967 boundaries and can therefore be considered an
international recognition of those boundaries as the territorial
limits of Israel. In fact, except for the attitude of the
Arab states, most of the international community presently
considers the 1949 armistice lines as the boundaries of Israel
even though the Armistice Agreements and international law do
not constitute them as such. Thus, Israeli exercise of de
facto sovereignty for twenty-one years may well have given rise
-to de jure sovereignty over the territory in question.
The issue of Israel's de jure sovereignty over this
territory will not be settled completely until a peace treaty
is concluded with the Arab states. Since all of the adjacent
Arab states except Syria have agreed to accept the Security
Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, as a basis for such
150
a peace treaty, and that Resolution provides for Israel to
withdraw only from the territory occupied in 1967 and for
151
recognized boundaries, " it appears that even the Arab states
are prepared to recognize that Israel has de jure sovereignty
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over the territory occupied in 1948-1949 in excess of that
included within the Jewish state under the Partition Plan.
However, this issue can not be settled until a general peace
settlement is concluded for the entire Middle East and until
such occurs, the territorial limits of Israeli de jure
sovereignty prior to June, 1967, will be uncertain.
C. JORDAN'S OCCUPATION AND SUBSEQUENT ANNEXATION
IN 1948-1949 OF THE WEST BANK AND THE OLD CITY
OF JERUSALEM.
Even before the hostilities that followed the establishment
of the State of Israel ended upon the conclusion of the
armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states in
152
1949, Trans Jordan 's leader, King Abdullah, m December,
1948, took steps to annex the areas of Palestine then occupied
by his army. These areas are those territories referred to
as the West Bank and the old city of Jerusalem and their
annexation preceeded the changing of the name of the state
153from Trans Jordan to Jordan on April 26, 1949.
The Zionists now contend that Jordan never acquired the
rights of a legitimate sovereign, or de jure sovereignty,
under international law, over those areas of mandatory
Palestine that came under its control during the 1948-1949
. . 154hostilities because Jordan's invasion of Palestine on
May 15, 1948, constituted a use of force in violation of
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155Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter.
Paragraph 4 of Article 2 provides:
4. All members (of the United Nations) shall
refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.
This provision, according to the Zionists, prevented Jordan
from acquiring sovereignty over the West Bank and the old city
of Jerusalem because the present international law rule is that
a state does not acquire title to any territory conquered
157through the illegal use of force and accordingly Jordan was
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at most a belligerent occupant. This conclusion is
supported by the facts that, according to the Zionists, only
Britain and Pakistan recognized the annexation, and the Council
of the Arab League declared it void and that Jordan was merely
. . 159holding the territories in trust for the Palestinian people.
In making this argument, the Zionists never reach the issue
previously discussed that a state does not acquire sovereignty
over conquered territory until there is a treaty of peace or
-I (zr\
a general cessation of hostilities, and therefore avoid
bringing into issue Israel's right of sovereignty over the
territory conquered in 1948-1949.
This argument on the part of the Zionists is part of their
claim to a right of sovereignty over the West Bank and the old
city of Jerusalem which will be examined later. However, before
examining the Zionists/Israeli right of sovereignty, Jordan's
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rights will first be discussed, as will Egypt's rights in
connection with the Gaza Strip.
The Zionists are correct that a conquest of territory in
violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations
Charter no longer gives rise to a right of de jure sovereignty
over the conquered territory. However, this has not always been
true under the rules of international law. At one time title
by conquest was recognized as a necessary right of a state to
wage war to either enforce the law or change existing legal
rights. Since the League of Nations Covenant, the General
Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the United Nations
Charter, prohibit war, most international writers now agree
that a state no longer acquires title through conquest when
it resorts to war in violation of international law. In
this regard Messrs. McDougal and Feliciano have written in
Law and Minimum World Public Order:
Traditional international law, that is, law before
its incorporation of the principle of minimum order
and the distinction between lawful and unlawful
resort to coercion, recognized military conquest
as a legitimate mode of changing a prevailing
distribution of power and other values among
nations. With the establ ishment of this principle
and distinction, there appears cogent reason for
urging that conquest may no longer be regarded as





This conclusion is reached because Article 10 of the League
of Nations Covenant prohibited, and Article 2, paragraph 3 of
the United Nations Charter prohibits, war as an instrument of
national policy. Coercion, as a method of conducting
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international relations, is forbidden and only peaceful methods
164
are authorized to settle international disputes. Thus, the
Zionists argue that because Jordan's invasion of the West Bank
and the old city of Jerusalem on Kay 15, 1948, was in violation
of the United Nations Charter, it never acquired de jure
sovereignty over this territory when it was subsequently
annexed
.
This argument raises three issues that must be examined in
determining Jordan's rights in regard to these territories.
First, was Jordan bound in 1948 by the provisions of the United
Nations Charter? Second, if Jordan was so bound did its
coercive actions come within any of the recognized exceptions
to the Charter? Third, if Jordan's coercive actions in May,
1948, were illegal, what was the effect of the methods used to
annex the territory in question?
Judge Lauterpacht, in 1952 limited the effect of the United
Nations Charter when he wrote:
...title by conquest remains a valid title in those
cases in which the conquering State is not bound by
the Charter of the United Nations or by the General
Treaty for the Renunciation of War or when, although
so bound, the resort to war on its part is not, in
the particular case, unlawful.
Evidently he had concluded that the United Nations Charter in
1952 was binding only on the member-states and did not constitute
customary international law. Therefore, since Trans Jordan was
not a member of the United Nations until 1955 some might
argue it was not bound by the Charter in May, 1948, and the
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possibility exists that it could have acquired title by-
conquest and subsequent annexation over the West Bank and the
old city of Jerusalem.
Considerable disagreement with this conclusion can be
expected from many international writers especially since the
Nurnberg Trials following World War II established the principle
that war for aggressive purposes is illegal. However, as
late as 1952 it can be said that there were differences of
opinion on the results of coercion as affecting sovereignty
over conquered territory.
The second issue raised by the Zionist argument is whether
Trans Jordan 's invasion of Palestine in May, 1948, was an act of
self-defense if it was bound by the United Nations Charter.
Self-defense, and coercion for that purpose, is specifically
authorized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which
provides in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations...,
This Article is considered a general statement which preserves
169 . .the inherent right of self-defense and specifically
authorizes "collective" self-defense.
Jordan's invasion of Palestine, as well as the other Arab
states invasions, has been labeled as collective action on the
part of the Arab states in defense of the rights of the
170 . . .Palestinian people. In considering the validity of this
claim under Article 51 of the Charter, the terror campaign
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waged by the Zionists in 1948-1949 against the Palestinian
people must be considered. The success of that campaign has
already been discussed and a reasonable conclusion can be
reached that if it were not for the actions of the Arab states,
including Transjordan, the Zionists would have conquered all
of mandatory Palestine and completely excluded the Palestinian
people
.
Another factor that must be considered is the Zionist
claim to all of the territory of mandatory Palestine and the
territory of Transjordan as it existed in 1949, for their
Jewish state. This claim was re-emphasized before the United
Nations in 1947, when the Palestine issue was being considered,
in the statements of the representatives of the Jewish Agency
before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. Dr.
Weizmann argued that the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine
had provided for the creation of a Jewish state with territory
. . 171
eight times what was provided for in the proposed Partition Plan.
Dr. Silver, who represented the Jewish Agency for Palestine,
said, in arguing for a Jewish state:
According to Mr. Lloyd George, who had been Prime
• Minister at the time, the Balfour Declaration
implied that the whole of Palestine, including
Transjordan , should ultimately become a Jewish
State. 172
These statements were consistent with the territorial claims
that had been made by the Zionists for some time and must be
173
considered in evaluating Jordan's actions.
Thus, when the Zionist terror campaign against the
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Palestinian people and their expressed territorial ambitions
are considered, a reasonable argument can be made that
Trans Jordan *s invasion of the West Bank and the old city of
Jerusalem was an act of collective self-defense as provided
for in Article 51. Accordingly, this coercion could be
considered legal and the territory conquered subject to eventual
annexation
.
The third issue to be considered in connection with the
Zionist claim concerns the method of annexation employed by
Trans Jordan in 1948-1949. It is claimed by the Zionists that
174this was an unilateral act on the part of King Abdullah but
the facts do not support this statement if the actions of the
Palestinian people are considered.
These actions began at the second Palestine Arab Conference
at Jericho which on December 1, 1948, passed a series of
resolutions regarding Palestine. The first of these resolutions
provided
:
1. Since Palestine was once part of natural Syria
(an Arab country) and since the Mandate which
was imposed on it without the consent of the
population and which lasted until the 15th of
May, 1948, did not lead the country to its
independence or its incorporation into one of
the independent sister countries, the people
of Palestine now see through political and
military developments in Palestine that the
time has come when active steps should be
taken with the cooperation of the neighboring
Arab States to safeguard their future and
decide their ultimate fate of living a life
of independence and freedom. It was therefore
decided that Palestine and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Trans Jordan be united into one
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Kingdom and that King Abdallah Bin Hussein
be proclaimed constitutional King over
Palestine
.
This resolution was officially acknowledged by the Government
of Transjordan on December 9, 1948, and by the Transjordan
Parliament on December 13, 1948. However, the Arab League
on December 14, 1948, protested these actions, apparently
because it was felt they conflicted with the official policy
of the League against partition of Palestine into Jewish and
177Arab states
.
After the hostilities in Palestine had been temporarily
halted under the 1949 Armistice Agreements, a general election
was held in Jordan on April 11, 1950, to choose a Parliament
in which both the East and West Banks would have equal
1 -7 O
representation. In this election 70 per cent of the voters
of the West Bank cast ballots and the newly elected National
Assembly formally approved the unification of Palestine and
Jordan on April 24, 1950, and the resolution of unity was signed
179by the King the same day. It provided m part:
1. Approval is granted to complete unity between
the two banks of the Jordan, the Eastern and
Western, and the amalgamation in one single
state: The Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan,
under the crown of His Hashemite Majesty King
Abdullah ben el-Husein the exalted. 80
This action was condemned initially by the Arab League
and it was proposed that Jordan be expelled from the League.
However, a compromise was reached "...by which Jordan on May
31, (1950) stated before the League that the annexation was
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without prejudice to the final settlement of the Palestine
,,181issue
.
The legal effect of these actions by Jordan and the
Palestinian people residing in the West Bank area, is unclear.
Jordan did not unilaterally annex the territory, as claimed by
the Zionists, since the Palestinian people participated in the
union of the territories . It can be argued that this
participation was an exercise of the right of self-determination
of peoples and that it was legally effective to transfer de
jure sovereignty to Jordan irregardless of the legality or
illegality of Trans Jordan 's conquest of the territory. It can
also be argued that Jordan had the legal right to annex the
West Bank and the old city of Jerusalem if the conquest was
legal under Article 51 of the Charter and thus acquired de jure
sovereignty in this manner.
The issue of Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank and
the old city of Jerusalem will probably not be decided until
a general peace treaty is concluded for the entire Middle East.
However, at present it can be said that there are certain legal
and factual bases to support a claim that Jordan is the de jure
sovereign over these territories and was not a belligerent
occupant, as claimed by the Zionists. It can also be said that
the only time the people of these territories exercised the
universally recognized right of self-determination, they voted
for union with Jordan.
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D. EGYPT'S OCCUPATION OF THE GAZA STRIP IN 1948-1949.
The legal status of the Gaza Strip must be considered
separately from the legal status of the West Bank and the old
city of Jerusalem, for although this area was occupied by Egypt
in 1948, it was never annexed or incorporated into Egypt.
This is an important difference, although this territory is
similar to that occupied by Jordan in 1948-1949 since it also
was included within the territory of the proposed Arab state
. . . 184
under the United Nations Partition Resolution.
Egypt remained in occupation of the Gaza Strip until
June, 1967, although Israel did occupy the area for some
time during the 1956 War. However, no state has ever recognized
Egyptian de jure sovereignty over the area. Great Britain,
which recognized the incorporation of the West Bank into Jordan
I oc
but not Jerusalem, adopted a policy that no state held
sovereignty over the Gaza Strip. However, this policy was
explained as being one that viewed the status of the Gaza Strip
as being uncertain and not that the territory was open for
occupation and annexation as if it were terra nullius.
Egypt's treatment of the Gaza Strip during the time its
armed forces occupied the area can be considered as a
recognition of the British view that the issue of de jure
sovereignty is uncertain. Since there is general agreement
that the territory was not subject to occupation and Egypt
never took steps to annex it after the 1948-49 War, it appears
clear that Egypt never became the de jure sovereign.
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Accordingly, the only conclusion that can be reached is that
de jure sovereignty remains in the entity that held such right
under the Palestine Mandate until such time that a general peace
treaty is concluded that settles the issue. In this regara,
Gaza must be considered unique since no state to any degree
had assumed the possible position of de jure sovereign prior
to the June, 1967, Six-Day War.
E. THE ZIONIST / ISRAELI OCCUPATION IN 1967 OF THE
WEST BANK, THE GAZA STRIP AND THE OLD CITY OF
JERUSALEM, CONSIDERING THE SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPTS
AT ANNEXATION.
During the Six-Day War in June, 1967, Israeli forces
occupied the remainder of Palestine as it existed under the
mandate and since that time the government has taken certain
steps to incorporate this territory within the area of Israel's
de jure sovereignty. Steps amounting to the annexation of the
old city of Jerusalem were taken by the Knesset on June 27,
1967, ' and since that time the government has opened this
area for Jewish settlement as announced by Deputy Prime Minister
189
Yigal Allon before the Knesset on December 10, 1969. At
that time it was revealed that 200 Jewish families had already
moved into a housing project in the Arab portion of the city
and that a total of 2100 apartments would be built on 810 acres
of land Israel had requisitioned after the June War. It was




with 300 private homes and an additional 2000 apartments.
This annexation and settlement of the old city of Jerusalem
has been formally condemned by the United Nations and the United
States on various occasions. The General Assembly at the Fifth
Emergency Session on July 4, 1967, adopted a resolution which
provided in part:
The General Assembly,
Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in
Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by
Israel to change the status of the City,
1. Considers that these measures are invalid;
2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures
already taken and to desist forthwith from
taking any action which would alter the
status of Jerusalem; ....
This resolution passed 90 to 0, with 20 abstentions including
192
the United States. However, the abstention of the United
States should not be regarded as an approval or recognition
of the Israeli action since even before the vote was taken,
on June 29, 1967, the government in a formal statement denounced
the action taken by Israel and said the United States would not
. . 193
recognize its validity.
Approximately a year later, on May 21, 1968, the Security
Council adopted a resolution which provided in part:
The Security Council,
Recalling General Assembly Resolutions 2253 (ES-V)
and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July, 1967,




Reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by
military conquest is inadmissible,
1. Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with
the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above,
2. Considers that all legislative and administrative
measures and actions taken by Israel, including
expropriations of land and properties thereon,
which tend to change the legal status of
Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that
status
;
3. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all such
measures already taken and to desist forthwith
from taking any further action which tends to
change the status of Jerusalem;....
Israel, of course, has ignored these resolutions as evidenced
by the reports of Jewish settlements on land expropriated from
the Arabs within the area of the old city of Jerusalem.
However, since the Six-Day War Israel has not limited
itself to the old city of Jerusalem but has also taken steps
to change the status of the West Bank area. These steps
followed the statement of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
on June 11, 1967, when he said, "I don't think that we should
in any way give back the Gaza Strip to Egypt or the western
195part of Jordan to King Hussein... " What followed this
statement is described as follows:
Acts committed for the alleged purpose of military
security, the systematic destruction of villages
of the West Bank, accompanied by the summary
removal of their inhabitants and the resultant
economic dislocation, has led many foreign observers
to consider seriously that this practice - by no
means infrequent - constitutes a policy, either




Actually, the Zionists appear to be pursuing the same
policy since 1967 that they followed in 1948 to 1949 of excluding
all non-Jews from the territory they intend to incorporate into
their state. In regard to the West Bank, however, they have
even prepared a legal argument to justify this possible
incorporation
.
This legal argument is based on the fact that Israel has
"reversionary" rights as the legitimate sovereign over the West
Bank: and concludes that "(t)he legal standing of Israel in the
territories in question (referring to the West Bank) is thus
that of a State which is lawfully in control of territory in
197
respect of which no other States can show a better title."
This conclusion is based on the argument, previously
discussed, that Jordan never acquired sovereignty over the
West Bank because its 1948 intervention was in violation of
the United Nations Charter and was aimed at defeating the
. . 198implementation of the United Nations Partition Plan.
Therefore, after the 1949 ceasefire Jordan was at most a
199belligerent occupant, according to the Zionists, and never
acquired the rights of a legitimate sovereign because a
belligerent occupant can not annex occupied territory either
before or after a cease fire or armistice but only after a
200
. .treaty of peace. Thus, the Zionists argue, m relation to
the West Bank "...Jordan is not entitled to the reversionary
. .
. 201
rights of a legitimate sovereign."
The interesting factor of this Zionist argument concerning
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the West Bank is that it completely ignores the actions the
Israeli government has taken to annex the old city of
Jerusalem. These actions have been condemned by the United
Nations Resolutions in which the International Community has
reaffirmed the principle that no state can acquire sovereignty
over territory controlled as a result of military conquest and
this principle is applicable to the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, as well as the old city of Jerusalem.
International law, as previously discussed, did at one
time recognize the acquisition of sovereignty over territory
. . 202
as the result of military conquest. However, today it
appears to be an accepted principle of international law that
the victor in any coercion situation does not acquire
sovereignty over conquered territory whether or not it is
203the aggressor. This, of course, was not an instantaneous
change in the law but one that has evolved over the last 80
204 .years. It was recognized in the Security Council Resolution
of November 22, 1967, which provides in part, "...the
. . . . . . . 205inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war",
and reaffirmed in the Security Council Resolutions of May 21,
1968. Accordingly, under this rule Israel has not acquired
de jure sovereignty over any of the territory it occupied during
the Six-Day War and can be regardeu only as a belligerent





F. CONCLUDING APPRAISAL OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
Israel's right to de jure sovereignty over the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip and the old city of Jerusalem is closely related
to its right of sovereignty over other territories under its
control. Basically, Israel exists as a sovereign state only
through the United Nations Partition Plan of November 29, 1947,
which has been referred to as an "act of international
207legislation." Its only recognized boundaries are those
9 OR
provided for under the Partition Plan and any territory
it controls in excess of those boundaries has been conquered
through the use of coercion.
The legal status of the territory the Zionists occupied
in 1948-1949 in excess of that provided for under the Partition
Plan is presently uncertain. It appears to this writer that the
international community, including all the Arab states except
Syria, has, through the November 22, 1967 Security Council
Resolution, proposed that Israeli de jure sovereignty be
recognized over this territory as part of a general solution
to the Middle East coercion situation.
However, there is no question about Israel's right of de
jure sovereignty over the territory occupied during the Six-Day
War in June, 1967, if the Resolutions of the United Nations
and accepted principles of international law are considered.
The international community has repeatedly refused to recognize
any such right of de jure sovereignty through these Resolutions
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which have as their basis accepted principles of international
law
.
One does not even have to arcept the principle that the
victor in a coercion situation never acquires sovereignty
over conquered territory, whether or not it is an aggressor,
to reach this conclusion. Even if the more liberal view that
territory conquered in a legal war can not be annexed until
there is a treaty of peace or a general cessation of
. . . 209 .hostilities, is applied, Israel can not be regarded as the
de jure sovereign over this territory since neither condition
has been fulfilled.
Accordingly, the only possible conclusion under
international law is that Israel has not acquired, and cannot
through annexation acquire de jure sovereignty over any of the
territory it occupied during the June, 1967, Six-Day War.
Thus, Israel must be regarded as a belligerent occupant of
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the old city of Jerusalem, the
Golan Heights and the Sinai, and is required to apply the
laws of war applicable to occupied territories within these
areas .
When the applicability of the laws of war are considered
three broad groups of claims arise concerning bases of power.
Two of these groups, those involving institutions and
resources, will not be specifically considered in this study.
210However, the third group, those involving people, will be
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considered in connection with the applicability of the 1949
Geneva Conventions to the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion
situation .
Claims regarding people relate to prisoners of war and
211
"...to the control of the inhabitants of occupied territory."
The laws of war applicable in regard to these claims consist of
a balancing of the principles of military necessity and
212 . . .humanitar lanism . Military necessity during a belligerent
occupation must take into consideration "...the security of
the occupation forces from hostile acts on the part of the
inhabitants..." and "...the maintenance of assured and adequate
sources and procedures of procurement for the needs of the
213
army of occupation." At the same time, the requirements
of humanitarianism, as basically embodied in the 1949 Civilians
Conventions, must be applied.
Therefore, in considering the applicability of the 1949
POW and Civilians Conventions to the Israeli/Palestinian people
coercion situation these concepts of military necessity and
humanitarianism are particularly relevant. Since Israel must
be regarded as a belligerent occupant in most of the territory
under its control, there would appear to be an initial
presumption that the 1949 Civilians Convention is applicable.
At the same time, the applicability of the 1949 POW Convention
to those Palestinian combatants detained by Israel will be
governed by similar standards, since both Conventions have a
common article that determines their applicability to coercion
., , . 215situations .
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IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE 1949 GENEVA
CONVENTIONS TO THE ISRAELI / PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
COERCION SITUATION.
Many writers in discussing the applicability of the 1949
POW and Civilians Conventions to the Israeli/Palestinian people
coercion situation consider only whether the Palestinian people
satisfy the requirements of Articles 4 and fail to first
determine whether the Conventions are even applicable to the
conflict, as provided in Article 2. What these writers fail
to recognize is that Article 2 determines which coercion
situations come within the Conventions and Article 4 of each
Convention determines which individuals in a given coercion
situation are entitled to their humanitarian protections.
Thus, before deciding that certain individuals satisfy the
criteria of Article 4 and are entitled to the protections
of the Conventions, it must first be decided that the coercion
situation satisfies the requirements of Article 2.
This task could be greatly simplified in the case of the
Palestinian people by determining that they are fighting on
behalf of the Arab states and therefore satisfy the requirements
of Article 2 in a derivative manner since all of the Arab
states adjacent to Israel are parties to the Conventions.
If this were done, the only remaining question would be whether
the requirements of Articles 4 were satisfied to determine that




However, this analysis would ignore the basic factual
situation of the present Middle East conflict in which the
Palestinian people must be regarded as a separate participant.
They are clearly not fighting on behalf of any of the Arab
states but for themselves and for their own objectives. Thus,
they are not entitled to the protections of the Conventions
in a derivative manner because the adjacent Arab states are
parties to the Conventions and can receive such protection
only if they as a separate entity satisfy the requirements of
Article 2.
The basic juridical issue involved is whether the
Conventions are applicable to a coercion situation between
a High Contracting Party, Israel, and a stateless people, the
Palestinian people, which takes place, in part, in territory
over which no state is the de jure sovereign. This is a
factual situation clearly not envisioned by the drafters of
the Conventions, as evidenced by their language and the
commentaries on them, since international hostilities normally
take place between states and the Conventions were intended to
regulate international coercion situations. Therefore, in
interpreting Article 2 to determine its applicability to the
Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation one must ignore
to a certain extent the plain meaning of the Article, and
look instead to the general purpose of the Conventions and
interpret the Article so as to give effect to that purpose.
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A. AN EXAMINATION OF ARTICLE 2 IN A TRADITIONAL MANNER.
When Article 2 was drafted the concern of the drafters
was not with international coercion situations in which one
of the parties was not a state but with the desire to make
the Conventions applicable to all instances of "armed conflict"
between the "High Contracting Parties" and not just to instances
of declared war. This concern arose because of the refusal of
certain states in previous international conflicts to apply
humanitarian conventions either because they contested the
legitimacy of one of the other belligerent states or because
there had been no formal declaration of war. There had also
been instances in which the occupation and subsequent
annexation of states had been given as a reason for not
217
applying the international conventions. In order to overcome
these claims as to the future non-applicability of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, Article 2 was drafted so as not to require
a formal declaration of war or the recognition of a state of
war by both parties to an international conflict. Still
the Conventions generally contemplated hostilities between
states since "(t)he kind of situation traditionally envisaged
in the course of development of the rules of warfare is, of
course, a conflict in which the participants on both sides
219
are nation-states."
Thus, the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions are
applicable "...in cases of declared war or armed conflict
220
where the state of war is recognized by at least one party. "^
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Traditionally, war has been defined as a contention between
221
states and armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2
•is defined as
(a)ny difference arising between two States and
leading to the intervention of members of the
armed forces . .
.
, even if one of the Parties
denies the existence of a state of war.
Accordingly, even though the drafters clearly intended to extend
the applicability of the Conventions to international coercion
situations in which war had not been formally declared, they
did evidently contemplate that the participants would be states,
and not a state and an entity such as the Palestinian people.
This was because the 1949 Geneva Conventions were drafted to
settle matters of controversy over the conduct of warfare
223following the experiences of World War II.
However, in drafting Article 2 the drafters envisioned
three types of coercion situations which would bring the
Conventions into effect. The first paragraph of Article 2
provides
:
In addition to the provisions which shall be
implemented in peacetime, the present Convention
shall apply in all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contract ing Parties , even
if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them. q
This paragraph clearly is concerned with coercion situations
arising between states since only states are High Contracting
Parties, and provides that the Conventions are applicable in all
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wars and armed conflicts between states which are signatories.
This paragraph is not applicable to the Israeli/Palestinian
people coercion situation because, although Israel is a High
225 . .Contracting Party, the Palestinian people are not and it is
questionable whether they have the juridical status to become
such until they are recognized as a state.
The second situation which brings the Conventions into
operation is determined by the second paragraph of Article 2,
which provides, "The Convention shall also apply to all cases
of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High




armed resistance." This paragraph, on its face, appears to
be applicable to the Middle East coercion situation because of
the Israeli occupation in June, 1967, of the territory of
certain adjacent Arab states which are High Contracting Parties,
227
namely Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. However, even if Israel
is considered a belligerent occupant of this territory and
it is considered the territory of High Contracting Parties,
the drafters of this paragraph evidently did not consider that
it would apply to this type of occupation.
This paragraph was intended to fill a possible gap in the
coverage of the first paragraph of Article 2. The International
Red Cross Commentary on the 1949 Civilians Convention states,
concerning paragraph 2:
It does not refer to cases in which territory is
occupied during hostilities; in such cases the
Convention will have been in force since the

71
outbreak of hostilities or since the time war
was declared. The paragraph only refers to
cases where the occupation has taken place
without a declaration of war and without
hostilities, and makes provision for the entry
into force of the Convention in those particular
circumstances
.
Therefore, if this interpretation is accepted the second
paragraph of Article 2 will be applicable only in those cases
229
where territory is occupied without any resistance and
would not be applicable to the coercion situation under
consideration because the Israeli occupation of the territory
in June, 1967, took place during an armed conflict. Thus, the
applicability of the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions to the
Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation can not be
dependent on either the first or second paragraphs of Article 2.
The last or third paragraph of Article 2 is concerned with
the applicability of the Conventions to coercion situations in
which one of the participants is not a High Contracting Party
and provides
:
Although one of the Powers in a conflict may not
be a party to the present Convention, the Powers
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by
it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to the said Power, if the latter ~.-.
n
accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
In essence this paragraph provides that a participant which is
a non-signatory to the Conventions can bring them into force
between it and a High Contracting Party simply by accepting
and applying their provisions. This acceptance need not be in
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the form of an express declaration but can be tacit and
231implied from a de facto application of the provisions.
All that is required is that formally or informally the non-
signatory participant in an international coercion situation
agree to be bound by the provisions of the Conventions to
enjoy the benefits of them.
Thus, the third paragraph of Article 2 raises the issue
of whether the Palestinian people can invoke the provisions
of the Conventions simply by accepting and applying them. This
paragraph speaks of a "Power" in a conflict and on its face does
not exclude an entity which is not a state but is still an
independent participant in an international coercion situation.
The issue then is whether it provides that the Conventions are
to be considered applicable to an international coercion
situation between a High Contracting Party and a non-state
participant, if the latter agrees to accept and apply their
provisions
.
In order to resolve this issue the purposes of the 1949
POW and Civilians Conventions must be considered and the
Conventions interpreted to give effect to those purposes. At
the same time the all-inclusive nature of the Conventions to
coercion situations is relevant in determining their
applicability and will also be considered.

73
B. AN EXAMINATION OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
UNDER THE GENERAL PURPOSE APPROACH / THE
PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS.
Generally, international law during a coercion situation
seeks to balance two competing factors in formulating rules
governing the conduct of war by the participants: military
232
necessity and humanitar lanism . This is normally accomplished
by international decision-makers formulating a common policy or
set of rules that will be applicable under varying conditions
throughout the world in all coercion situations of an
233international nature. The international laws governing the
conduct of war, and in particular the treatment of war victims,
are therefore, a uniform standard applicable to all participants
in international coercion situations which have as an underlying
purpose the promotion of humanita rianism
.
This purpose of the laws of war is the entire basis of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, including the POW and Civilians
Conventions . These Conventions were not intended to be solely
a codification of the existing 1949 international law or a
revision of previous Conventions, but rather entirely new
Conventions extending humanitarian principles of law to all
234people affected by modern warfare. In this respect they are
intended to be all inclusive and were drafted on the basis of
past experience during the 20th century.
World War II had demonstrated the inadequacy of the then
existing laws of war to protect humanitarian values and "(t)he
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Geneva Conventions were established in 1949 to reinstate and
reinforce certain basic humanitarian rights that belong to
. . . . . 235
every individual involved in an armed conflict." The 1949
Geneva Conventions are, therefore, a humanitarian effort to
^ C~\
control the treatment of war victims and should always be
interpreted to accomplish this purpose to the greatest possible
extent
.
In this regard the Conventions are intended for
humanitarian purposes rather than being solely contractual
237
engagements between the parties and they "...have been drawn
up first and foremost to protect individuals and not to serve
o q o
State interests." Thus, Article 1, which provides, "(t)he
High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure
239
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances,"
has been interpreted as requiring a party to apply the
Conventions even if a belligerent party breaches its obligation
240
to do so. However, the term "in all circumstances" refers
241
to the situations defined in Article 2 so that that Article
still determines to what coercion situations the Conventions
are applicable.
Therefore, in determining the applicability of the
Conventions their purpose of extending humanitarian protection
to all war victims must be considered. They were not intended
to benefit states but individuals and should always be
interpreted to effect this purpose. The result of denying
the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in a given
coercion situation will be that the war victims involved will
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be left virtually unprotected and the purpose of the
international dec is ion-makers in drafting the Conventions
will be defeated.
C. THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE ISRAELI /
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE COERCION SITUATION.
When the applicability of the 1949 POW and Civilians
Conventions to the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation
is considered one important consideration is whether this
conflict is one of an international character. Generally,
the international laws of war, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, are applicable only to international conflicts
and municipal law is applicable to internal or non- international
conflicts. This was recognized by the drafters of these
Conventions when they included Article 3 in each Convention,
which in itself was a radical departure from previous
Conventions. Article 3 is intended to provide minimal
protection to war victims in coercion situations not of an
international character and represents the first time that
any of the provisions of an international convention were
. . 242
extended to internal conflicts or civil wars.
This extension of international law to non-international
coercion situations is helpful in determining whether the 1949
POW and Civilians Conventions are applicable to the Israeli/
Palestinian people coercion situation. The Conventions were
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intended to be all-inclusive and extend certain humanitarian
protections to all war victims and Article 3, which extends
. . . . . 243 .
only minimal protections to war victims is applicable only
244
to non-international coercion situations. Therefore, if
the coercion situation under consideration does not come within
the provisions of Article 3 it can be assumed that the drafters
intended it to come within the provisions of Article 2 and its
war victims to enjoy the more extensive protections of the
Conventions. It is only in this manner that the all-inclusive
applicability of the Conventions will be achieved and their
purposes effectuated.
1. TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION
Before considering the applicability of Article 3 to the
coercion situation under consideration brief mention should be
made of the traditional distinctions between international
war and civil or internal war. Traditionally, international
writers have applied the rule, " (t)o be war, the contention
245 ...
must be between States." At the same time civil war is
defined as the situation, "...when two opposing parties within
a_ State have recourse to arms for the purpose of obtaining
power in the State, or when a large portion of the population
246
of a_ State rises in arms against the legitimate Government".
Civil war has also been defined by Messrs. McDougal and
Feliciano as
. . .a_ genuinel y internal conflict within a_ nation-
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state in which a counter-elite group either seeks
forcibly to organize a new political unit separate
from the old body politic, or to capture effective
control of existing governmental structures.
Thus, these definitions limited international war to conflicts
between states and civil wars to conflicts within a state or
an internal insurrection. Neither would encompass the Israeli/
Palestinian people coercion situation since it is a contention
between a state and an entity which is not a state which is
taking place across international boundaries and not within
the territory of a single state.
Other international writers have extended the definition
of international war to include those civil wars in which the
rebels have achieved belligerent status. They define
international war as coercion between states or "...civil war
248
where the rebel elements have achieved belligerent status."
A civil war in which the rebels have not achieved belligerent
status is still not recognized as an international war and
accordingly, only Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is
249
applicable to such conflicts.
Even according to this view of the applicability of the
laws of war, the Palestinian people would either have to
comprise a state or be engaged in a. civil war, i.e., a war
within the territory of a single state or internal insurrection,
and be recognized as belligerents, before the international
laws of war would be applicable to their coercion situation
250
with Israel. The facts, previously discussed, do not
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support either of these conclusions. Accordingly, if the
traditional rules of international law are utilized the 1949
Geneva Conventions would not be applicable in that, except for
Article 3, they are applicable only to international coercion
situations
.
2. A VALUE ORIENTED APPROACH TO A DEFINITION OF
INTERNATIONAL COERCION
International law, as any other system of law, must
develop to meet changing circumstances and new factual
situations. It can not remain static but must change so as
to be applicable to new situations of international coercion,
such as the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation.
The failure of international law to so react will only result
in a world order in which coercion rather than the rule of law
controls the destinies of peoples.
Thus, in determining whether a particular coercion
situation is of an international nature so that the international
law of war is applicable, the traditional rules must frequently
be ignored and the coercion situation analyzed by considering
the purposes and functions of the laws of war. This requires
an inquiry into the factual and policy problems involved which
can be a meaningful inquiry only after "...the decision-maker
(the applier) is identified, his policy objectives clearly




The Palestinian people have been examined in this manner
with the conclusion that they are an independent participant
• 252in a coercion situation with a sovereign state, Israel.
They are clearly seeking their own objectives, are not fighting
on behalf of any state, are possessed of their own bases of
power, and have initiated coercion across international
boundaries. Accordingly, they must be regarded as an
independent non-state participant in a coercion situation
that is not confined to the territory of a single state. The
issue that remains, however, is whether the resulting coercion
situation is one of international character under international
law so as to be governed by the broad and extensive provisions
of the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions or is one of non-
international character so that at most Article 3 of the
Conventions would be applicable.
Messrs. McDougal and Feliciano have suggested that war or
international coercion exists where there results "...the
253factual process of coercion across national boundaries".
This definition also requires an analysis of the objectives
of the participants and their methods of operation under the
254
existing conditions of the coercion situation and therefore
does not suggest that all coercion projected across international
boundaries is to be accorded the protection of international law.
It only furnishes a starting point for a juridical inquiry into
the nature and character of any given coercion situation.
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This definition does recognize that any analysis of the
laws of war, particularly the 1949 POW and Civilians
Conventions, that are applicable to a given coercion situation
must depend on the total nature cf the coercion situation and
the purposes of the laws of war that are under consideration.
The war victims are the most important factor in any such
analysis because "(t)he basic effort is to minimize the
unnecessary destruction of values through the application of
255
a law of war..." Therefore, what is required is an
"...orientation in the process of legal decision by which
community intervention is organized in the attempt to regulate
256international coercion." Such an orientation is important
in considering the laws of war because in essence they are
standards imposed by the world community which regulate the
conduct of international coercion between participants and in
some instances when the participants involved have not
2 57previously agreed to be bound
.
Thus, in considering the character of the coercion
situation between Israel and the Palestinian people this method
of analysis has been utilized. It is clear that the starting
point has been reached because there presently exists "...the
258factual process of coercion across national boundaries".
This is trie without determining the territorial limits of
Israel since the Palestinian people operate across the
Lebanonese and Jordanian borders and, accordingly, the legal
status of the occupied territories is not initially relevant
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to this inquiry. What is relevant are the purposes of the 1949
POW and Civilians Conventions, the nature and character of the
coercion situation in issue, the nature and objectives of the
participants , and the "...process of legal decision by which
community intervention is organized in the attempt to regulate
259international coercion". The first three factors have
previously been discussed and a discussion of Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions is relevant to a consideration of the
fourth
.
3 . ARTICLE 3 : ITS RELEVANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CHARACTER OF THE ISRAELI / PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
COERCION SITUATION.
Article 3 is relevant to the applicability of the general
provisions of the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions if one
considers that through it the drafters excluded certain
coercion situations with the intention of including all other
coercion situations of an international character within the
possible applicability of Article 2. Thus, if the Conventions
are to be considered all-inclusive any coercion situation not
within the coverage of Article 3 would be considered within
Article 2 as one of an international character.
Article 3 provides in part: "In the case of armed conflict
not of an international character occuring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
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provisions:...." The Article then lists the applicable





Article 3 is relevant in determining whether the Israeli/
Palestinian people coercion situation is to be considered one
of international character because
(i)t applies to non-international conflicts only,
and will be the only Article applicable to them
until such time as a special agreement between
the Parties has brought into force between them
all or part of the other provisions of the
Convention.
In determining what types of conflicts are to be considered
non-international the language of Article 3 is extremely
relevant. That language speaks of conflicts "...occurring
*"? fc\ "3
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, ..."
and can be construed to mean a conflict occurring solely
within the territory of a single state.
This construction is reasonable from the language of the
Article and is also supported by those familiar with the
drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The international
264Red Cross Commentary reviews the drafting of Article 3
and then states,
...the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed
conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged
in hostilities - conflicts, in short, which are in
many respects similar to an international war, but ?fic.
take place within the confines of a_ single countr y.
This is the type of conflict normally referred to as a civil war
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or internal insurrection, and must be contrasted with those
conflicts which take place between two or more states or in the
territory of two or more states and are referred to as
international wars or coercion situations.
Since Article 3 is applicable to coercion situations not of
an international character, the type of hostilities described
therein must be regarded as non- international in nature. Thus,
if the coercion situation under consideration does not "...take
o /- r
place within the confines of a single country..." it can be
assumed that the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions would
classify it as one of international character and, if the
other requirements are satisfied, the international laws of
war would be binding on the participants. This definition of
international coercion is in agreement with the definition
previously discussed of "...the factual process of coercion
O £\ "7
across national boundaries" and both would classify the
Israeli/Palestinian people conflict as an international
coercion situation.
When the coercion situation between Israel and the
Palestinian people is considered in this manner it must be
considered one of international character since it takes place
beyond the territorial limits of a single state. Accordingly,
the international laws of war must be considered applicable
if the participants comply with the provisions of that law





D. CONCLUDING APPRAISAL AND ANALYSIS OF THE
APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE 1949 GENEVA
CONVENTIONS TO THE ISRAELI / PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE COERCION SITUATION.
Basically, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including the POW
and Civilians Conventions, were designed to protect all people
affected by international coercion and necessarily require a
balancing of the old claim of military necessity with this
humanitarian purpose. At the time they were written, the
Conventions and their drafters, did not anticipate an
international coercion situation in which one of the
participants would not be a state. Accordingly, the
Conventions were written with the traditional definition
of international coercion as a contention between states
in mind.
The Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation
necessitates a re-examination of this concept of the
applicability of the international laws of war because it
is not a contention between states but still takes place
beyond the borders of a single state. Thus, international
law is faced with a challenge as to whether or not it will
recognize this type of coercion situation as being within
the coverage of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Under the third paragraph of Article 2 a participant in
an international coercion situation should be able to enjoy
the protections of the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions for
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its people if it agrees to accept and apply their provisions
in its relations with the other belligerent power. This
interpretation will give the maximum effect to the purpose of
the Conventions by extending their humanitarian provisions to
all people affected by an international coercion situation.
This will also achieve the balancing of this purpose with the
claim of military necessity, which is the basic purpose of the
international laws of war.
Accordingly, the only logical conclusion that can be
reached is that the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion
situation is within the provisions of the third paragraph
of Article 2, as one in which one of the Powers to a conflict
is not a High Contracting Party. The purpose of the 1949
POW and Civilians Conventions was to extend certain
humanitarian protections to all war victims and this purpose
will not be achieved in this instance unless such a conclusion
is reached. Article 3 is clearly not applicable since the
Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation is not a civil
war or internal insurrection in that it does not take place
solely within "...the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties...'.' Therefore, to give effect to the humanitarian
purposes envisioned by the drafters the conflict must be
regarded as one of international character and the provisions
of the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions made available to
all resulting war victims. The only action required of the
participants is for both belligerents to accept and apply
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those provisions, although such action by only the Palestinian
269people would require Israel to do likewise. This aspect of
the problem will be considered in the succeeding sections of
this study.
This same conclusion has been reached by the United Nations
General Assembly and Security Council which have adopted various
resolutions calling upon all the participants in the Middle East
coercion situation to apply the 1949 POW and Civilians
270 ....Conventions. In addition, it is supported by the third
catagory of combatants under Article 4 of the 1949 POW
Convention which are entitled to prisoner of war status
upon detention by the enemy. That catagory consists of those
regular armed forces fighting on behalf of an authority not
recognized by the detaining power and will be fully discussed
in the next section of this study.
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V. THE INDIVIDUALS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE 1949 POW
CONVENTION IN THE ISRAELI / PALESTINIAN PEOPLE COERCION
SITUATION.
Even though it has been determined that the 1949 POW
Convention is applicable to the Israeli/Palestinian people
coercion situation, the issue remains as to which individuals
are entitled to its protections. Basically, these individuals
can be divided into three catagories for this inquiry: first,
the members of the Israeli armed forces, second, the members
of the various Palestinian guerrilla organizations operating
from outside Israel and the occupied territories, and third,
the members of the various Palestinian guerrilla organizations
operating inside Israel and the occupied territories. All of
these catagories of military personnel will be considered since
the Israeli military personnel are entitled to the protections
of the 1949 POW Convention just as are the Palestinian military
personnel, under the applicable doctrines.
This opinion is not shared by the Israeli government as
evidenced by a statement of its foreign minister. Mr. Abba
Eban has stated the official position as follows:
Addressing a British Labor Party branch in Jerusalem,
Foreign Minister Abba Eban stated on August 5 that the
Fatah terrorist organization was outside the
jurisdiction of international law and could not
claim its protection.
Accordingly, Israel has refused to apply the provisions of the
1949 POW Convention to any of the Palestinian guerrilla
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fighters when they are captured or surrendered and in so doing
has ignored various resolutions of the United Nations.
These United Nations Resolutions date from June 14, 1967,
when the Security Council said "...that all the obligations of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties
272involved in the conflict,...*; This resolution was
acknowledged by the General Assembly on July 4, 1967, and its
language repeated in a General Assembly Resolution of that
273date, and was reaffirmed by the Security Council on
274September 27, 1968. Still, Israel has refused to apply
the provisions on the 1949 POW Convention to detained
Palestinian combatants.
Many writers have assumed outright that this Israeli
refusal is a violation of public international law and have
failed to determine whether the individuals so detained are
entitled to the protections of the Convention. Others have
assumed the Palestinian forces are resistance fighters and
are therefore entitled to the protections of the Convention.
At the same time the United Nations has called upon all parties
to the conflict to observe the provisions of the 1949 POW
Convention but has never specified which individuals are
entitled to its protection.
This section will be a juridical inquiry into this issue
under Article 4 of the Convention . It should be recalled that,
although Article 2 determines which coercion situations are
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regulated by the Convention, Article 4 determines which
specific individuals in a given coercion situation are entitled
to its protections. Therefore, an initial determination that
the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation is to be
regulated by the 1949 POW Convention under Article 2 does not
mean that all detained combatants are within the provisions of
Article 4 so as to be entitled to its protections.
Article 4 recognizes several catagories of combatants that
are entitled to the protections of the Convention, three of
which will be analyzed in this study. The other catagories
of individuals entitled to prisoner of war status provided for
in Article 4 will not be discussed since they are not
considered primarily relevant to the coercion situation in
question
.
Initially, Article 4 provides,
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present
Convention, are persons belonging to one of
the following catagories, who have fallen
into the power of the enemy: . .
.
and then proceeds to list several catagories. This initial
paragraph does however, set forth two conditions that must be
satisfied before an individual is to be accorded the status
of a prisoner of war. The first condition is that he must
belong to one of the enumerated catagories, and the second
is that he must have "fallen within the power of the enemy".
This second condition need not be extensively discussed
but it should be noted that it applies to all individuals who
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come under the control of the enemy, whether they are captured
or surrender, and are within one of the enumerated
*-\
—j /-
catagories. The "enemy" refers to any adversary during
an armed conflict or declared war that is within the provisions
of Article 2. Thus, in the case of the Israeli/Palestinian
people coercion situation the second condition is satisfied
when individual combatants come under the control of the other
belligerent, whether they surrender or are captured, since it
has previously been determined that this conflict is within
. . . 277 . ...the provisions of Article 2. Accordingly, the individual
catagories of detained combatants that are protected by the
Convention will now be discussed.
A. MEMBERS OF PARTISAN GROUPS AS PROTECTED COMBATANTS.
Some writers that have considered the applicability of the
1949 POW Convention to the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion
situation have concluded that the Palestinian combatants must
be considered prisoners of war upon detention because they are
partisans. This conclusion is apparently based on the claim of
the Palestinian people that they are resistance fighters,
O "7 Q
fighting the Zionist occupation of Palestine, and fails to
adequately analyze the factual bases of this claim. Such an
analysis will be made in this study but before proceeding to
that discussion the provisions of Article 4 concerning
resistance fighters or partisans will be first considered.
These provisions deal with the second catagory of
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combatants that are entitled to prisoner of war status under
Article 4 and provide
:
(2) Members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized
resistance movements, belonging to a_ Party to
the conflict and operating in or outside their
own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfil the following
conditions
:
(a) that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of
war.
Article 4A (2), quoted above, appears to have been
designed to extend the protections of the 1949 POW Conventions
to the resistance-type military organizations that operated
during World War II throughout Europe. Since these
organizations were loosely organized, did not normally wear
uniforms and concealed their weapons, specific provisions were
2 80included in this regard. It was also agreed at the 194 9
Geneva Conference that the partisan organizations would have
to have an adequate military organization to ensure that the
conditions were fulfilled.
These requirements are detailed in paragraph A(2) of
Article 4 and it was believed that their inclusion would give
this section limited applicability. One writer has observed that
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(m)embers of organized resistance movements will
rarely meet the tests established by Article 4
since, to accomplish their mission, they must
work secretly, wear no uniforms, conceal their
weapons and withhold their identify prior to
their strike. 2
Even Messrs. McDougal and Feliciano noted this factor when
they wrote
:
Guerrilla forces commonly fail to exhibit all the
characteristics that belligerents have habitually
required as prerequisites for admission to the
catagory of permissible combatants. Subordination
to a responsible commander has perhaps been easy
enough. ...Compliance with the other traditional
requisites of permissible combatancy, however, is
commonly rendered very difficult by the very nature
of guerrilla operations. Carrying arms openly
and displaying "fixed, distinctive and recognizable
signs" would clearly often preclude the secrecy
and tactical surprise essential to the success of
guerrilla warfare.
Although these opinions concern the contemplated limited
nature of the applicability of the 1949 POW Convention to
partisan forces, they also help to provide a definition of that
type of combatant. Generally what was contemplated by the
drafters of the Convention as partisans were those civilian
inhabitants of occupied territories who join guerrilla forces
and take part in active combat with the forces of the belligerent
occupant
.
These operations are generally "...characterized by
mobility, stealth and secrecy, and an ability to sink at will
. . . 284into the protective anonymity of the civilian population."
Therefore, in considering whether Palestinian combatants should
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be considered as partisans these observations should be
considered and it must be determined whether they more
resemble regular armed forces or partisans, as contemplated
by the drafters of the 1949 POW Convention.
When this provision of Article 4 relating to partisan
combatants is applied to the Palestinian people a number of
interesting legal and factual issues therefore become relevant.
Only those resistance forces fighting on behalf of a party to
the conflict are entitled to prisoner of war status so it must
first be determined if this condition is satisfied. In this
regard, the International Red Cross Commentary provides:
Resistance movements must be fighting on behalf
of a "Party to the conflict" in the sense of
Article 2, otherwise the provisions of Article
3 relating to non- internat ional conflicts are
applicable, since such militias and volunteer
corps are not entitled to style themselves as
a "Party to the conflict."
This paragraph relates, of course, to the traditional
concept that only a state can be a belligerent in an
international coercion situation previously discussed and
rejected, and if strictly applied to the factual process
of coercion in the Middle East could result in the denial
of prisoner of war status to the Palestinian combatants. It
has previously been determined that the Palestinian people
are an independent participant in the Middle East coercion
situation, and are therefore, not fighting on behalf of any
n p -7
state and are accordingly themselves parties to the conflict

One method of avoiding this problem is to accept the
Zionist claim that the Palestinian combatants are really an
entity created by the Arab states. In this respect, the
Zionists claim that the Palestinians are not their own masters
TOO
and are therefore not an autonomous factor in the conflict.
If this claim were to be accepted, then the Palestinian
combatants would be entitled to prisoner of war status since
they would be fighting on behalf of parties to the conflict
which are also High Contracting Parties under Article 2. The
only relationship required between resistance fighters and
the "party to the conflict" is
...a de facto relationship between the resistance
organization and the party to international law
which is in a state of war . . . (which) . . . may
find expression merely by tacit agreement, if the
operations are such as to indicate clearly for „ ftq
which side the resistance organization is fighting.
This relationship may be indicated by actions such as the
290delivery of weapons and supplies or by an affirmative
declaration by the government of one of the national entity
participants. Clearly, this relationship has been established
between the Palestinian people and the Arab states, if the
former are not to be regarded as an independent participant
in the Middle East coercion situation.
Other Zionist claims concerning the Palestinian combatan
would also appear to satisfy the first three conditions that
resistance fighters must meet before they are to be accorded
prisoner of war status. Yosef Takoah, Israeli Ambassador to
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the United Nations, has stated that
(t)oday it is public knowledge that these raiders
(referring to the Palestinians) are organized in
para-military units, appear in military uniforms,
undergo military training with the armies of Jordan,
Egypt, Syria and Iraq, receive their weapons from
those armies and are commanded by regular army
officers
.
This statement, therefore, would satisfy the requirements that
the resistance forces are fighting on behalf of a party to the
conflict, are commanded by a responsible person, have a
recognizable fixed sign and carry arms openly.
Additional claims made by the Zionists that the Palestinians
operate from Jordan and other Arab countries, outside the
292
occupied territories, and that they "...are not local
293inhabitants of the West Bank or the Gaza area" and are
therefore not entitled to prisoner of war status, are easily
answered. Resistance forces are entitled to the protections
of the 1949 POW Convention no matter where they are operating,
whether in their territory or outside, on water, on land or
in the air, and whether within or without of occupied
294territories .
Israel's claim that the Palestinians are led by regular
army officers is not justification for the denial of prisoner
of war status since the leaders of the resistance forces may be
either military or civilian. The requirement is only that the
leaders are responsible for the action taken on their orders
295
and maintain discipline as m regular armed forces.
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The Zionist claim that the Palestinian combatants appear
in uniform does not mean that the requirement that a sign be
worn by resistance fighters, which is fixed and distinctive,
recognizable at a distance, replacing a uniform and worn at all
296times, has not been satisfied. Normally it is required that
"...the sign must be the same for all members of any one
resistance organization, and must be used only by that
297
organization." In fact, some international writers have
even suggested that this requirement may no longer need to be
satisfied since "...combat military uniforms today are
deliberately designed to enhance invisibility by visual
298integration into the immediate environment". However,
since the requirement of the distinctive sign is to identify
the wearer as a combatant, the wearing of uniforms by the
Palestinians, although not the same for all members, would
satisfy this requirement. The uniform clearly identifies
the wearer as a combatant.
Under Article 4 resistance forces must carry their arms
openly but this does not mean they must always carry arms or
that such arms must always be visible. For example, a hand-
grenade or a revolver may be carried in a pocket or under a
coat and the requirement of carrying arms openly is still
u • *' a 299satisfied .
The only remaining requirement the Palestinian combatants
would have to satisfy is to conduct their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war. In this regard,
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partisans are required to apply the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
be guided by general moral criteria respecting humanitarian
principles of not causing undue suffering in proportion to
military objectives, and not to attack civilians and other
unarmed persons. Although both the Israelis and the
Palestinians claim the other side violates this standard, and
these claims will be examined later, the acceptance and
application of them by the Palestinians would satisfy this
requirement for the future
.
Therefore, if the Zionist claims concerning the Palestinian
combatants are accepted it would appear that those individuals
are entitled to prisoner of war status upon detention by
Israeli authorities. However, these claims are based on the
assumption that the Palestinians are not an independent
participant in the Middle East coercion situation, and are
controlled and directed by the Arab states. They also assume
that the Palestinian combatants are to be considered resistance
forces as that term is used in Article 4 of the 1949 POW
Convention
.
It is submitted that both of these assumptions are
incorrect and it is generally inappropriate to classify the
Palestinian combatants as partisans or resistance fighters.
The independence of the Palestinian people as a separate
participant in the Arab hostilities with Israel has previously
301 ...been discussed, so that it is illogical to conclude they
are fighting on behalf of the Arab states. They are clearly
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fighting for themselves and their own objectives. Accordingly,
they are fighting on behalf of a party to an international
coercion situation which is not a state or a High Contracting
Party within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 2,
but rather on behalf of a "Power" within the meaning of the
third paragraph of Article 2.
Additionally, the nature of their activities and
organization does not support a conclusion that they are
partisans as contemplated by Article 4 of the 1949 POW
Convention. That Article contemplated combatants who are
primarily civilians and who engage in hostilities on a limited
basis within occupied territories, although it is applicable
302both within and without occupied territories. The great
bulk of the Palestinian combatants are organized into regular
military units that do not resemble in any manner the partisan
or resistance organizations that existed in occupied Europe
during World War II. Al-Fatah, under the leadership of Yasser
Arafat, who is also the President of the Executive Committee
303 .
of the Palestine Liberation Organization, is the dominant
Palestinian military organization and presently has a full-time
304 ...
army of 40,000 men, based primarily in Jordan. Accordingly,
it is suggested that these combatants are not partisans as
contemplated by Article 4 but are, in fact, regular armed
forces of an independent participant in the Middle East
coercion situation.
This is not to suggest that there are no Palestinian
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combatants that can not be regarded as partisans and entitled
to be classified as prisoners of war upon detention by the
Israelis. There are no doubt certain groups of individuals
within Isiael and the occupied territories, or who infiltrate
into these areas, that are in fact partisans or resistance
fighters within the meaning of Article 4 of the POW Conventions
Provided these individuals satisfy the four criteria set forth
they are entitled to prisoner of war status upon detention.
However, what is suggested is that the great majority of the
Palestinian combatants more resemble regular armed forces as
contemplated by Article 4, in that they operate in military
units, openly and from outside the territory controlled by
Israel .
B. MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AS PROTECTED COMBATANTS.
This is the first category of protected combatants under
Article 4A (1), which provides, "Members of the armed forces
of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or
305
volunteer corps forming a part of such armed forces."
Included within this category are all members of the armed
forces, land, sea and air, of the enemy who fall under the
power of a participant in the conflict. It is contemplated
that these individuals will be members of the regular armed
forces fighting on behalf of a state since the International
Red Cross Commentary on the 1949 POW Convention provides that
(i)t is the duty of each State to take steps so
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that the members of its armed forces can be
immediately recognized as such and to see to
it that they are easily distinguishable from
members of the enemy armed forces or from
civilians .
One might initially react that the Israeli armed forces
satisfy these conditions and its individual members are
entitled to prisoner of war status upon detention by the
Palestinians, and that the Palestinian combatants do not
in that they are not fighting on behalf of a state. It is
suggested that the individual combatants of neither of these
participants are entitled to prisoner of war status under
this catagory because an additional requirement for its
applicability is that the armed forces must belong to "...a
Government whose legal status is not contested by the other
r> 4- "
308Party".
This additional qualification is of particular relevance
to the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation since
neither participant recognizes the legal status of the other.
Prime Minister Meir of Israel has recently stated that there
. . . 309
is no such entity as either a Palestinian nation or people,
and the government of Israel denies that the Palestinian
people are a separate entity under international law or that
310they are entitled to the status of a subject of that law.
At the same time, the entire Palestinian people's program for
the liberation of Palestine, the elimination of Zionism and
the establishment of a secular state, is based on the
311
contention that Israel was illegally created.
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Accordingly, this qualification of mutual recognition
between participants in an international coercion situation
must result in the conclusion that the individual combatants
of neither are not entitled to prisoner of war status upon
detention under this provision of Article 4. However, the
drafters of the Article, based on the experience of World
War II, provided for such an eventuality in the third catagory
of combatants entitled to prisoner of war status under the 1949
POW Convention.
C. MEMBERS OF THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES WHO PROFESS
ALLEGIANCE TO AN AUTHORITY NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE
DETAINING POWER AS PROTECTED COMBATANTS.
Article 4A (3) of the 1949 POW Convention provides that
protected combatants are "Members of regular armed forces who
profess allegiance to a government or an authority not
. . 312
recognized by the Detaining Power." This catagory was
included in Article 4 because
(d)uring the Second World War, certain States refused
to recognize as belligerents combatant units which
professed allegiance to a Government or ...authority
which these States did not recognize.
One of these groups of combatants during World War II was the
French followers of General de Gaulle who operated from England
after the German occupation of France and which were treated as
prisoners of war upon capture only because the Germans considered
314that they were fighting on behalf of England.
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It is evident to anyone familiar with both situations that
the Palestinian people of 1970 closely resemble the Free French
Forces under General de Gaulle of the 1940's. Both entities
lost their state through the result of conquest by a foreign
state and thereafter began a campaign to liberate their state
from the territory of third states. It is this type of
coercion situation that this provision of Article 4 was designed
to encompass
.
What is required is that the combatants be members of
regular armed forces which differ from those combatants of
mutually recognized participants in only one respect: "...the
authority to which they profess allegiance is not recognized by
315the adversary as a Party to the conflict". Regular armed
forces in both these catagories must satisfy three criteria,
they must wear uniforms, have an organized hierarchy, and know
and respect the laws of war.
Paragraph A(3) of Article 4 specifically provides that
these armed forces must profess allegiance to "a government or
31*7
an authority" and, therefore, they do not have to be fighting
on behalf of a recognized or existing state, but simply "an
authority". However, the authority on behalf of which they are
fighting should be recognized by some states or third parties,
O "1 Q
but does not have to be recognized by the Detaining Power.
This catagory of combatants do not have to be fighting
on behalf of one of the High Contracting Parties to the 1949
319 . ...POW Convention and this provision is therefore closely
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related to the third type of coercion situation in Article 2
in which one of the participants in an international coercion
320situation is not a party to the Convention. All that is
required in this situation is that the authority must accept
. . 321
and apply the provisions of the Convention.
How then does this catagory of combatants apply to the
Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation? Since neither
participant recognizes the legal status of the other, their
combatants appear initially to be within this catagory. The
Israeli armed forces are fighting on behalf of a government,
although not recognized by the Palestinian people, which is
recognized by numerous states and is a member of the United
Nations. They also wear uniforms and have an organized
hierarchy and, therefore, would be within the provisions of
this catagory and entitled to the protections of the 1949 POW
Convention provided they accept and apply the laws of war,
including the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
At the same time the Palestinian combatants are fighting
on behalf of an authority which is recognized by third parties,
namely the Arab states as evidenced by the membership of the
322Palestine Liberation Organization in the Arab League, and
the refusal of Israel to recognize this authority as an
independent participant in the Middle East coercion situation
is of no effect. The Palestinian combatants also wear uniforms,
323
as evidenced by the statement of Ambassador Takoah, and have
an organized hierarchy, as evidenced by the Palestine
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• i • • . . 324Liberation Organization and its various organs. Again, all
that remains is that they accept and apply the laws of war,
including the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
D. CONCLUDING APPRAISAL OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
1949 POW CONVENTION.
The catagories of protected combatants that are presently
taking part in the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation
can be classified as partisans and regular armed forces.
Although some can be so regarded generally most of the
Palestinian combatants can not be classified as partisans
because they do not possess the contemplated characteristics.
Rather, they resemble regular armed forces as do the Israeli
combatants
.
However, those Palestinian combatants that are partisans
as contemplated by Article 4A (2) should be treated as
prisoners of war upon detention by Israeli authorities
provided they satisfy the four requirements previously
discussed. At the same time, the majority of the Palestinian
combatants and the Israeli combatants are entitled to prisoner
of war status upon detention by the enemy since they are within
the definition of regular armed forces and are fighting on
behalf of an authority or government not recognized by the
other belligerent. Therefore, all the combatants in the
Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation should be
treated as prisoners of war upon detention by the enemy and
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both participants should formally agree to accept and apply the
protections of the 1949 POW Convention to the other's
combatants
.
The frequent failure of both participants in the Israeli/
Palestinian people coercion situation to accept and apply the
laws of war and the 1949 Geneva Conventions will be fully
discussed in the concluding sections of this study. This
should, of course, be a reciprocal acceptance and application
if the purposes of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are to be
effectuated. Those purposes of balancing military necessity
with humanitarianism are particularly relevant to detained
combatants
.
Since prisoners of war constitute bases of enemy
power already effectively neutralized by capture,
the further direct application of violence against
them would result in a destruction of values with-
out military significance.
Accordingly, there can be no claim of military necessity
sufficient to justify the failure to accord protected
combatants the protections of the 1949 POW Convention.
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VI. THE INDIVIDUALS ENTITLED TO THE STATUS OF "PROTECTED
PERSONS" IN THE ISRAELI / PALESTINIAN PEOPLE COERCION
SITUATION
.
Article 4 of the 1949 Civilians Convention determines which
individuals are entitled to its protections when they are
affected by an international coercion situation within the
provisions of Article 2. These individuals are referred to
as "protected persons" and can reside either in the territory
TO/"
of an enemy belligerent or in occupied territories.
Therefore, in the context of the Israeli/Palestinian people
coercion situation the juridical status of the various
territories under Israeli control is relevant to any
determination of whether the civilians residing therein are
"protected persons" and to which protections of the Convention
327they are entitled.
When the 1949 Civilians Convention is considered, Israel
must be regarded as a belligerent occupant in all of the
o o o
territory it occupied during the Six-Day War in June, 1967.
This territory includes the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the
Golan Heights, the old city of Jerusalem and the Sinai
329 . . ...Peninsula. In addition, there are some juridical bases
that support an argument that Israel should be regarded as a
belligerent occupant in all of the territory occupied in 1948-
1949 in excess of that allotted to the Jewish state under the
. . 330United Nations Partition Plan. However, m the analysis
of the applicability of the 1949 Civilians Convention this
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territory will be considered as within the international
boundaries of Israel.
Since it has already been concluded that the 1949 Civilians
Convention should be applied by the participants in the Israeli/
•
. . . 331Palestinian people coercion situation, the consideration in
this section will focus on whether it has been applied in the
past and which individuals are entitled to the status of
protected persons. However, before proceeding to such a
consideration it should be pointed out that under international
law and the provisions of the 1949 Civilians Convention, any
attempts by Israel to alter the status of the occupied
territories can have no effect on the applicability of the
Convention
.
International law, as previously discussed, does not
recognize a change in status of occupied or conquered
territories through annexation or subjugation until there
has been either a treaty of peace or a general cessation of
. . . 332 . . .hostilities. Since neither has taken place in the Middle
East coercion situation since June, 1967, the Israeli attempts
to annex parts of the occupied territories are of no effect
for "...calling an occupation by the name of subjugation will
not avail the occupant (of) a means of evading the obligations
333
of an occupant imposed by international law". Accordingly,
Israel must be regarded as a belligerent occupant in all of the
territory occupied during the Six-Day War and must apply the




This rule is also expressed in Article 47 of the 1949
Civilians Convention which provides
:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory
shall not be deprived, in any case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the
present Convention by any change introduced,
as the result of the occupation of a territory,
into the institutions or government of the said
territory, nor by any agreement concluded between
the authorities of the occupied territories and
the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the
latter of the whole or part of the occupied
territory .
This Article recognizes the international rule that an Occupying
Power can not annex occupied or conquered territory as long as
. . . . 335the hostilities continue ~ and sets forth the fundamental
principle that
...an Occupying Power continues to be bound to apply
the Convention as a whole even when, in disregard
of the rules of international law, it claims during
a conflict to have annexed all or part of an
occupied territory. JD
It is clear, therefore, that under both international law and
the 1949 Civilians Convention, Israel can not avoid the
prescriptions of the Convention by claiming that it has annexed
part of the occupied territories.
A. AN INQUIRY INTO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE
1949 CIVILIANS CONVENTION.
Prior to discussing which individuals are entitled to the
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status of protected persons under Article 4 certain protections
extended by the 1949 Civilians Convention will be considered.
It is the purpose of this inquiry to demonstrate that neither
participant in the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation
have absolutely applied the protections of the 1949 Civilians
Convention and the laws of war to civilian persons. Accordingly,
both belligerents have failed to comply with the various United
Nations Resolutions recommending that they apply the Convention
337
to protected persons, and have ignored the humanitarian
principles of the laws of war.
The violations by the Palestinian people are evident from
the various attacks on Israeli citizens, especially the recent
attack on the Israeli school bus in which eleven children and
O O Q
teachers were killed and twenty injured. This attack, for
which the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine took
339 . .
credit, was clearly a violation of the laws of war forbidding
. . . 340 . .
attacks on unarmed civilians. Similar attacks on tourist
buses carrying foreign nationals and resulting in deaths and
341injuries are equally violative of the laws of war.
It appears that these attacks are an expression of the
official policy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, and other splinter organizations which exponds
. . . . . . 342terror tactics against civilians, including children.
. . . . . 343Rocket attacks on civilian settlements within Israel, and
attacks on Israeli civilian airplanes and the bombings of El
344
Al airline offices in foreign states are further expressions
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of this policy. At the same time, the Palestinian hijackings
of civilian airlines and the detention of Israeli hostages to
be returned for captured Palestinian combatants is clearly a
violation of Article 34 which provides, "(t)he taking of
. . 345hostages is prohibited."
It should be noted, however, that the Palestine Liberation
Organization claims that these incidents were the action of
splinter groups and do not represent the policy or the operations
of the great majority of the Palestinian people. While deploring
such attacks, the P.L.O. claims that its combatants limit their
operations to military targets within Israel and the occupied
. . . 346territories, and do not attack civilians. Such claims raise
the issue of whether the dominant guerrilla forces should be
held responsible for such attacks as evidence that the
Palestinian people have not accepted and applied the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the laws of war.
Since the purpose of the laws of war and particulary the
1949 Geneva Conventions is to extend humanitarian protections
347 . ...
to all war victims, it is suggested that the responsibility
for these violations must rest on the entity that has been
identified as the Palestinian people. One could easily
conclude that such responsibility should not be so placed by
arguing that the aforementioned violations were the actions
of splinter groups that have been excluded from the dominant
Palestinian organization, the P.L.O. It could also be argued
that since not all but only most of the members of guerrilla
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organizations must observe the laws and customs of war to enjoy
the protections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, that the
violations by splinter groups do not affect the general
application of the Conventions.
However, such arguments merely avoid the issue and would
result in further violations by splinter groups of the laws of
war and the Conventions. Past experience has shown that the
Israelis will not ignore such actions but will respond by
. . . . . 349
attacking civilian targets in reprisal. The result is that
further violations occur and the purpose of the laws of war
and the Conventions is not given effect. Accordingly, rather
than excuse the Palestinian people for the conduct, the efforts
of the international community must be directed towards seeking
compliance by all the Palestinian people, as well as the
Israelis, with the applicable laws of war.
There is also considerable evidence that Israel has also
violated the 1949 Civilians Convention and the laws of war since
350the Six-Day War, as noted in various United Nations Resolutions.
The steps taken by Israel to annex the old city of Jerusalem
351previously discussed are clearly a violation of Article 47
of the Convention which prohibits annexation, as do the rules
352 . .
of international law. In addition the steps taken since
this illegal annexation to expropriate and destroy the
property of the Arab residents of the old city are clearly a
violation of Article 53 since such action took place after the




was not a valid claim. Article 53 provides
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real
or personal property belonging individually or
collectively to private persons, or to the State,
or to other public authorities, or to social or
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except
where such destruction is rendered absolutely
necessary by military operations.
However, the most evident violations of the 1949 Civilians
Convention are those involving collective punishments which are
prohibited by Article 33, which provides:
No protected person may be punished for an offense
he or she has not personally committed. Collective
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation
or of terrorism are prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property
are prohibited .355
Since the June, 1967, Six-Day War, Israel has continually
violated Article 33 and defended its actions with the claim
that they are in retaliation for acts of terror. Initially
Israeli forces blew up the homes of those Arabs within the
occupied territories who were suspected of being members of
the Palestinian guerrilla groups or giving them assistance.
This was referred to as a policy of counter-terror, not
collective punishments, and supposedly affected only those
persons collaborating with or belonging to the Palestinian
356groups and not the non-members or non-collaborators.
However, the policy of blowing up the homes of only active
guerrillas and those aiding them was not effective and a new
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policy consisting of large-scale home demolitions within the
occupied territories was instituted. Israel's Defense Minister
says this policy is the most effective way of discouraging the
357people from protecting the guerrillas and that it consists
of "...demolishing the homes of Arabs who had been uncooperative
in investigations of terrorism or who had declined to furnish
information", whereas, "(p)reviously demolition was limited to
358the homes of those actually engaged in terrorism".
Defense Minister Dayan claims that this new policy does not
constitute collective punishment but rather neighborhood
punishment. In explaining the policy of neighborhood punishment
he has said, "(t)oday we are not only punishing individuals who
commit crimes, but also those around them who in silent knowledge
. . 359
of what is afoot, fail to alert the authorities". He has also
indicated that Arabs who fail to cooperate will be deported.
The Israeli policy of neighborhood punishments has also
been clarified by General Shlomo Gazit, who is responsible for
coordinating activities within the occupied areas. He explained
that neighborhood punishment is not arbitrary since the Israelis
"...are not hitting anyone who is really innocent... (and)
punish only those people we are definitely sure were involved
in actively cooperating and in helping the terrorists".
Resulting from the Israeli policy of neighborhood punish-
ments has been torture and deportations as well as the
destruction of an estimated 7,140 Arab homes as of October,




of connexion with guerrilla activity was living in them".
It has also been used in the form of a 24 hour a day curfew
in which Arabs in the West Bank are not permitted outside
their homes to shop or to use their outdoor latrines for
*3 C O /
periods up to a week at a time.
These activities by the Israelis within the occupied
territories clearly violate not only Article 33 but also
. . . . 364Article 49, prohibiting deportations, Article 27, forbidding
*3 C^ E\
inhumane treatment, and Article 31, prohibiting coercion to
be used in gaining information. They are mentioned not to
sustain a claim that the Israelis violate the 1949 Civilians
Convention while the Palestinian people obey its provisions,
but to demonstrate that contrary to popular belief both
participants have been guilty of conduct that violate the
humanitarian provisions of the Convention and of the absolute
necessity to ensure compliance with its provisions at the
earliest possible date.
These violations by one participant normally result in a
violation by the other and are, therefore, not only breaches
of the 1949 Civilians Convention, but also counter-productive.
When one participant breaches the applicable laws of war, the
other responds in like manner, with the resulting war victims
caught in the middle. The issue remains, however, as to which
of the affected individuals are entitled to the status of
protected persons under the Convention.
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B. PROTECTED PERSONS WITHIN ARTICLE 4.
Article 4 of the 1949 Civilians Convention provides in
part
:
Persons protected by the Convention are those who,
at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever,
find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation,
in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the
Convention are not protected by it....
The remainder of the Article deals with nationals of neutral
and co-belligerent states and persons within the protection of
one of the other 1949 Geneva Conventions, and provides that
these individuals are not entitled to the protections of the
of; Q
1949 Civilians Convention.
Basically two classes of civilian persons were deemed to
need the protection of the Civilians Convention by its drafters;
first, "...persons of enemy nationality living in the territory
of a belligerent State," and second "...the inhabitants of
369 . . .
occupied territories". Accordingly, the provisions of
Article 4 extend the protection of the 1949 Civilians Convention
to "...those civilians who, 'at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever', find themselves in the event of a conflict or
occupation in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying
370power of which they are not nationals."
At first glance, Article 4 does not clearly appear to
provide that these civilian persons are entitled to the
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status of protected persons, but it is now agreed that the
Civilians Convention applies in the territory of a belligerent
state to all "...persons of foreign nationality and to persons
without any nationality" and in occupied territories "...to all
371persons who are not nationals of the occupying State."
The only relevant exceptions to this coverage are "(n)ationals
of a State which is not bound by the Convention" and persons
372protected by one of the other 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Thus the Civilians Convention "...is intended to cover
anyone who is not a national of the Party to the conflict or
373Occupying Power in whose hands he is". Stateless persons
are included within the protections of the Convention because
(t)he negative form of the phrase _rn the hands of
a_ ( party to the conflict or occupyin g ) Power of
which they are not nationals makes . . . stateless
persons,... not being nationals of the Detaining _> 74
or Occupying Power . . . ipso jure protected persons
.
How, then, do these provisions relate to the Israeli/
Palestinian people coercion situation so as to determine which
individuals are entitled to be considered protected persons
under the Civilians Convention? Basic to any consideration
of this nature is the status of the territory in which the war
victims are located. Since the Convention distinguishes between
375the territory of a belligerent state and occupied territories
such a distinction must also be made in the Israeli/Palestinian
people coercion situation.
The provisions of the Convention relating to aliens in the
*3 *7 fc\
territory of a party to the conflict ' ' must be considered
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applicable within all areas in which Israel is recognized as
the de jure sovereign and within its pre-June 1967 boundaries.
Accordingly, it would appear that all the Palestinian people
who are not Israeli nationals within this territory are
entitled to be considered protected persons because they are
in the territory of a belligerent state of which they are not
nationals. Since most of these individuals are in fact
stateless persons the protections of the Convention would
definitely extend to them and also to the Palestinian people
who have acquired Jordanian nationality since Jordan is a
377Party to the Convention.
At the same time the provisions of the Convention dealing
specifically with occupied territories must be considered
applicable within the territories occupied by Israel during
the Six-Day War. Thus, it would appear that all the Palestinian
people within these territories are entitled to be classified
as protected persons in that they are inhabitants which are not
379 . ...
nationals of Israel. In this regard, occupied territories
must be considered as those areas in which the state or power
in control does not have, under international law, the right
o o r\
of de jure sovereignty. The fact that Israel can not be
considered the de jure sovereign over any of the territory
occupied during the June, 1967, Six-Day War, has previously
been discussed and, accordingly, all of these areas must be




This conclusion is based, of course, on the conclusion that
Israel has never acquired the status of the de jure sovereign
over any of the territory it occupied in June, 1967. However,
even if Israel has become in fact and law the de jure sovereign
over any or all of this territory the provisions relating to
enemy aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict would
be applicable, for then it would be the territory of a
o o 9
belligerent state. In this event, the provisions of
Article 4 regarding persons of enemy nationality and stateless
o o o
persons would be applicable, and any Palestinians within
these areas would still be regarded as protected persons.
It would also appear that the Israeli nationals who find
themselves within the control of the Palestinian people outside
the territory of Israel are also entitled to the status of a
protected person. Although there is at present no Palestinian
state and one might argue that these Israeli citizens are
therefore not in the territory of a belligerent state, for
example if they were detained in Turkey, the general purpose
of the Convention as evidenced by Article 4 would apply to
such individuals. That purpose is to extend the protections
of the convention to all individuals in the hands of a power
of which he is not a national or to which he does not profess
384 ...
allegiance. Israeli citizens oi nationals detained by
the Palestinian people would clearly come within that purpose .
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C. CONCLUDING APPRAISAL OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
1949 CIVILIANS CONVENTION TO THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE COERCION SITUATION.
The conclusions reached in this section are based to a
large extent on the applicability of Article 2 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions to the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion
situation. That Article's applicability is dependent on both
participants accepting and applying the provisions of the
Convention to bring its civilians within the status of protected
persons under Article 4. In the past there have been violations
of specific provisions of the Convention by both belligerents,
however, these past violations would not prevent the Convention
from being applicable in the future.
The prospects and necessity for all participants to accept
and apply the 1949 Geneva Conventions will be discussed in the
next section of this study. Suffice to say at this point that
this requirement is the only possible reason why both
belligerents are not bound to afford civilians under their
control the applicable protections of the 1949 Civilians
Convention
.
It should also be noted that the status of protected
persons under the 1949 Civilians Convention is closely related
to the status of prisoners of war under the 1949 POW Convention.
Prisoners of war in either the territory of an enemy state or
in occupied territories are not entitled to the protections
385
of the 1949 Civilians Convention, but rather to the more
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extensive protections of the 1949 POW Convention. However,
combatants who do not fall within the status of prisoners of
war are still entitled to the protections of the 1949 Civilians
Convention. This is emphasized by the International Red
Cross Commentary which provides:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status
under international law: he is either a prisoner of
war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention,
a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or
again, a member of the medical personnel of the
armed forces who is covered by the First Convention.
There is no intermediate status : nobody in enemy
hands can be outside the law.
Thus, for example, the regulations governing the treatment of
-3 O Q
interned persons must be applied to detained combatants who
are not entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4 of
the 1949 POW Convention. This is in keeping with the purpose
of the Conventions of extending humanitarian protections to
all war victims under one of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.
It is for this reason that immediate action should be taken by
the international community to seek compliance with the
provisions of these Conventions by both participants in the
Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation.
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VII. CONCLUDING APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
This study has been an inquiry into the applicability of
the international laws of war, specifically the 1949 POW and
Civilians Conventions, to a coercion situation of international
character in which one of the participants is not a state. That
participant has been identified as the Palestinian people which
as an independent entity with its effective military and
political influence might well determine the destiny of the
entire Middle East. However, this aspect of the significance
of the Palestinian people as a participant was not investigated
but rather the immediate juridical issue to be resolved was
whether in the hostilities between only Israel and the
Palestinian people the resultant war victims are entitled to
the protections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This
necessitated an inquiry into whether the 1949 Geneva Conventions
are applicable in a coercion situation of international character
in which one participant is a nation-state and the other is a
public organization independent of any nation-state.
A preliminary conclusion has been reached that these war
victims, prisoners of war and civilian persons, should be
entitled to the protections of the Conventions because the
coercion situation between Israel and the Palestinian people
satisfies the basic prerequisites of Article 2, and the
affected individuals are within the catagories specified
by Article 4, of each Convention. Basically, a two-step
analysis has been utilized in which it was concluded that
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the coercion situation under inquiry was one of international
character in which the international laws of war should be
applicable and that the war victims are within those classes
of individuals entitled to certain humanitarian protections
envisioned by the rules of international law. The only possible
reason that these humanitarian principles are not available for
the protection of the resulting war victims is the failure of
both participants to accept and apply the provisions of the
Conventions and the laws of war.
Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that
they are applicable to international coercion situations in
which the participants are a High Contracting Party and a non-
signatory Power, provided the latter agrees to accept and apply
their provisions. Although in the Israeli/Palestinian people
coercion situation the non-signatory Power, the Palestinian
people, is not a state and international law is normally
389
applicable only between states, the general purpose of the
Conventions requires that they be applied by both participants.
That purpose is to extend to all war victims resulting from
international coercion the humanitarian principles that are
embodied in the Conventions. It can be achieved in this instance
only if the Conventions are applied by the participants even
though one of them is not a nation-state.
However, even though the conclusion has been reached that
the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions should be applied by the
participants in the Israel/Palestinian people coercion situation
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there is considerable evidence that neither has absolutely
accepted and applied their provisions in the past. Certain
Palestinian groups have engaged in a terror campaign in which
civilians are the primary targets and which resembles the
Zionist terror campaign of 1948-1949. At the same time the
Israelis have violated the Conventions within the occupied
territories. Resulting from these activities has been the
unnecessary and unproductive destruction of values and a
continuing deterioration of the entire Middle East coercion
situation. They have also given rise to the claim that since
the other belligerent has not accepted and applied the
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as required by
Article 2, the claimant is not obliged to do so.
One method of avoiding this reciprocal acceptance and
application of the provisions of the Conventions is to
recognize them as customary international law. There is some
390
evidence that they are regarded as such and therefore are
applicable in a situation of international coercion irregardless
of the attitudes and policies of the participants. Certainly,
the humanitarian principles they embody are now recognized by
the international community as minimum standards for the
conduct of modern warfare and should be observed by all
belligerents. Accordingly, it is suggested that the 1949
Geneva Conventions be treated as customary international law
and that the appropriate international decision-makers take
immediate action to seek compliance with their humanitarian




In the past although the United Nations and the various
states that are directly or indirectly involved in the Middle
East crises have occasionally condemned the violations of the
Conventions by both Israel and the Palestinian people, they
have concentrated most of their efforts on finding an overall
solution to the continuing coercion situation. At the same time
the violations of the Conventions have continued, their
humanitarian purposes have been ignored on a daily basis and
the associated destruction of values has increased.
It is suggested that this approach in attempting an
overall solution has been and will be ineffective and that
the acceptance and application of the 1949 POW and Civilians
Conventions by all the participants including Israel and the
Palestinian people, should be the first step that must be
taken in successfully resolving the Middle East crises. This
suggestion is based on the belief that unless a minimum
destruction of values is recognized and promoted during periods
of armed conflict the level of coercion will gradually increase
along with increased destruction of values until the solution
of the underlying causes of the hostilities can no longer be
reached in a peaceful manner but only through continued coercion
In the case of the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation
this must necessarily mean the complete destruction of one of
the participants.
This stage of the Middle East coercion situation has not
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yet been reached but is becoming more evident in the statements
of the leaders of both the Palestinian people and Israel. Thus,
it is time to change directions and begin a step by step process
that wil] lead to a resolution of the underlying causes of the
conflict and to the establishment of a minimum system of world
public order in the entire Middle East.
Accordingly, it is suggested that the United Nations and
the world community of states direct their immediate efforts at
resolving the Middle East crises towards gaining the consent of
all the participants, particularly the Palestinian people and
Israel, to apply the provisions of the 1949 POW and Civilians
Conventions. The United Nations has in the past condemned
Israel for its alleged violations but has ignored the violations
of the Palestinian people. It is suggested that this trend be
changed and that the world organization seek compliance by all
participants with the Convention's humanitarian provisions.
At the same time the United States as the principal supporter
and supplier of Israel should seek Israeli compliance.
This study was intended as an inquiry into the
applicability of the 1949 POW and Civilians Conventions to
the Israeli/Palestinian people coercion situation. What is
important in this conflict to this writer is not which
participant is right or wrong, justified or unjustified, but
rather whether the resultant war victims are enjoying the
humanitarian protections of international law to which they
are entitled. It is clear that in the past this has not been
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the case and that there has been an unnecessary destruction of
values which can not in any manner be justified under a claim
of military necessity. Only if all involved participants agree
to accept and apply the applicable laws of war can this
destruction be significantly decreased and further steps be
taken to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict in a
peaceful manner. The alternative is a continuing destruction
of values, further escalation of the hostilities, and no
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